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Doctoral Dissertation in Psychology  
 
Abstract  
 
 
This thesis investigates a specific type of judgments, answerability 
judgments, that is the judgment if anyone can provide a correct answer to a 
particular question. Answerability judgments are important since they may 
affect other important decisions regarding e.g., climate change and medical 
and legal decision making. Four studies were performed. Study I compared 
participants’ ratings of the answerability of three types of general knowledge 
questions. Both current answerability (whether the question was currently 
answerable by someone) and future answerability (whether the question 
could be answered in the future) were measured. Study II compared pairs 
and individuals on answerability judgments on general knowledge questions. 
Study III investigated judgments on whether ‘I’, ‘somebody else’, or 
‘nobody’ could answer general knowledge questions. In Study IV 
answerability judgments on the colours of an ambiguous viral photograph, 
The Dress, were investigated. Self-report measures of individual differences 
were also conducted in Studies I, III, and IV.  
The results from the studies suggest that social influence is important 
when judging question answerability. Data suggest that people often judge 
answerability in line with their beliefs about what most relevant others 
believe. This is called the consensus effect.  
However, individual differences also explained variation in answerability 
judgments especially when consensus about the question’s answerability was 
lacking. People with higher scores on certainty beliefs, mankind’s 
knowledge, mankind’s efficacy, and preference for default processing, more 
often rated general knowledge questions as being more answerable. On the 
other hand, higher scores on personal optimism and need for cognition was 
associated with more choices of ‘nobody can answer’. 
Questions that were considered more answerable today were also often 
judged to be possible to answer in a closer future suggesting that judgments 
of answerability may include judgments of psychological distance. 
Furthermore, the result suggests that a feeling of higher answerability can be 
created, through contextual associations, even when it is unlikely that 
somebody can come up with an answer. Lack of consensus was associated 
with lower answerability judgments.  
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Svensk sammanfattning  
 
Bakgrund och övergripande syfte 
  
Är det farligt att använda mobiltelefon? Är den anklagade verkligen skyldig? 
Finns det ett säkert sätt att lagra använt kärnbränsle? Kan man verkligen säga 
att det finns ett klimathot?  Ibland kan viktiga frågor anses svåra att svara på. 
Till och med så svåra att en person kan ifrågasätta om det över huvud taget 
finns någon människa som någonsin kan komma med ett säkert svar, dvs om 
frågan är besvarbar. Bedömningar av frågors besvarbarhet är viktiga att 
studera eftersom sådana bedömningar kan påverka andra viktiga beslut som 
kan få konsekvenser för individ och samhälle, t.ex. hur stora insatser som 
behövs för att minska global uppvärmning eller vilka produkter som ska 
förbjudas av hälsoskäl. Detta innebär, att trots att bedömningar av frågors 
besvarbarhet ibland kan vara svåra att göra, är det ändå viktigt i många 
sammanhang att sådana bedömningar blir realistiskt gjorda.  
Även om denna typ av bedömningar är viktiga finns inte mycket 
forskning gjord på hur det egentligen går till när människor kommer fram till 
om, och i så fall när en fråga kan besvaras. Vad påverkar bedömningarna? 
Finns det t.ex. vissa typer av frågor som tenderar att bedömas som mer 
möjliga att besvara än andra?  Blir bedömningarna olika om de görs i grupp 
eller individuellt? Finns det människor som tror att frågor i allmänhet har 
svar?  Och går det att få frågor att verka mer eller mindre besvarbara än de 
verkligen är? För att börja undersöka en del av dessa frågeställningar (och 
några andra) gjordes fyra studier. Tidigare forskning har främst undersökt om 
man själv är säker på sitt eget svar, och inte så mycket om man tror att någon 
överhuvudtaget kan svara (undantaget viss forskning av t.ex. 
riskbedömningar). När det gäller besvarbarhetsbedömningar är det troligt att 
en person börjar med att fråga sig själv om denne tror sig kunna svaret. Om 
så inte är fallet kan personen börja fundera över om någon annan kan svaret 
eller kan komma fram till ett svar inom en rimlig framtid. Denna avhandling 
har i fyra olika studier utforskat människors bedömningar av frågors 
besvarbarhet.  
I Studie I bedömde 476 deltagare 22 frågor med avseende på om de var 
möjliga att besvara av någon nu levande människa, idag eller i framtiden 
(idag, om ett år, om två år, 10 år, …. etc.). De 22 frågorna var indelade i tre 
kategorier: konsensusfrågor (där forskarna antog att majoriteten av svenska 
folket tror att frågan är besvarbar), icke konsensusfrågor (där forskarna antog 
att majoriteten av svenska folket tror att frågan inte är besvarbar) samt 
illusionsfrågor. Illusionsfrågorna var beräkningsfrågor där en variabel 
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fattades för att beräkningen skulle kunna utföras. Konsensusfrågorna 
upplevdes som mest besvarbara, därefter illusionsfrågorna och sist icke-
konsensus frågorna. En del deltagare trodde att vissa frågor aldrig skulle 
kunna besvaras. Två skalor användes, en där deltagarna fick bedöma om 
någon kunde besvara frågorna i dag, och en skala där deltagarna fick bedöma 
när (om någonsin) någon kunde besvara frågorna. Frågor som upplevdes som 
mer besvarbara idag bedömdes också kunna bli besvarade i en mer snar 
framtid. 
Individuella skillnader i bedömningar av besvarbarhet undersöktes också. 
Personer som trodde på säker kunskap och på mänsklighetens förmåga att 
kunna lösa problem bedömde icke-konsensus frågorna som mer besvarbara. 
Mer optimistiska personer trodde i större utsträckning att icke- konsensus 
frågorna inte kunde besvaras av någon idag. Deltagare som antog att 
illusionsfrågorna var besvarbara föredrog en kombination av en mindre 
intellektuell och mer intuitiv tankestil.  
Studie II jämförde par och individer på besvarbarhetsbedömningar. 
Trettioen individer och trettio par gjorde besvarbarhetsbedömningar av 20 
allmänna kunskapsfrågor (fyra konsensusfrågor och sexton icke-konsensus 
frågor). Paren gav högre besvarbarhetbedömningar än individerna på frågor 
med bedömd besvarbarhet på över 80%, och lägre besvarbarhetsbedömningar 
än individerna för frågor med lägre besvarbarhet än 80%. Förklaringen därtill 
är troligen att paren eftersträvar konsensus och att söka konsensus är en 
viktigare del av besvarbarhetsbedömningen för paren än för individerna.  
Studie III undersökte deltagares uppfattning om vem som kunde besvara 
allmänna kunskapsfrågor. Totalt 123 deltagare bedömde 46 allmänna 
kunskapsfrågor och fick svara på om de själva, någon annan eller ingen 
kunde svara på frågorna. Det var 26 konsensusfrågor och 20 icke-konsensus 
frågor. Innan varje fråga fick hälften skatta sin egen kunskap om frågan. 
Alternativet ”ingen kan svara” valdes mer ofta för icke-konsensusfrågorna än 
för konsensusfrågorna. Deltagarna som fick skatta sin kunskap innan de 
gjorde bedömningarna valde mer sällan ”ingen kan svara”. Detta kan bero på 
att kunskapsskattningarna aktiverade minnen som gjorde att deltagarna tänkte 
på möjligheten att någon kan besvara frågan.  Deltagare som trodde på 
möjligheten av säker kunskap i allmänhet, och hade högre 
maximeringstendenser (dvs försöker hitta bästa möjliga beslutsalternativet, 
inte bara ett som är tillräckligt bra) svarade oftare ”någon annan vet” på icke-
konsensus frågorna. Deltagare med en preferens för att ägna sig åt 
tankeverksamhet (hög ”need for cognition”), valde mer sällan ”någon annan 
vet” för både konsensus och icke-konsensus frågor. Detta kan förklaras 
genom att personer med preferens för att ägna sig åt tankeverksamhet skulle 
kunna vara mer benägna att acceptera att det finns frågor som inte har svar, i 
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kombination med att dessa personer är svårare att övertyga om de redan 
skaffat sig en personlig uppfattning. 
 I Studie IV undersöktes besvarbarhetsbedömningar av färgen i ett 
tvetydigt färgfotografi av en klänning (det virala fenomenet #TheDress). 
Fotografiet blev ett viralt fenomen i början av 2015 på grund av att vissa 
personer såg en blå och svart klänning medan andra såg en klänning i vit och 
guld på samma fotografi. Totalt svarade186 personer på tre frågor 1) om de 
hade sett bilden förut, 2) vilka färger de såg (blå/svart; vit/guld; annat, 
nämligen) och 3) vilka färger de trodde var rätt svar (blå/svart; vit/guld; 
annat, nämligen; det finns inget rätt svar). Personerna skattade också hur pass 
optimistiska de var. Alternativet ”det finns inget rätt svar” tolkades som att 
frågan inte var besvarbar. Personer som hade mer erfarenhet av fotografiet 
trodde att det fanns ett rätt svar i högre utsträckning än de som såg det för 
första gången. De som var mer optimistiska trodde i högre utsträckning att 
det inte fanns något rätt svar om färgen på klänningen, En intressant 
iakttagelse var också att 19% av de som hade sett klänningen förut såg 
klänningen som vit och guld, men trodde att blå och svart var rätt svar. Detta 
visar i linje med aktuell minnesforskning att människor ibland inte tror på det 
de ser och minns.  
 
 
Slutsatser och framtida forskning 
 
Sammantaget visar studierna på att bedömningar av besvarbarhet är viktigt 
att se i det sociala sammanhang där bedömningen görs. Resultaten från de 
fyra studierna föreslår att människor ofta väver in vad andra tror om frågans 
besvarbarhet i sin egen bedömning av frågans besvarbarhet, dvs ”tror de 
flesta andra att frågan är besvarbar så tror jag också det”. Konsensus eller 
brist på konsensus om frågans besvarbarhet kan alltså vara ett viktigt 
kriterium när människor bedömer en frågas besvarbarhet. Vilken effekt som 
föreställningar om enhetligheten i andras åsikter om svaret på en fråga har på 
besvarbarhetsbedömningar kan variera beroende på omständigheterna. När 
föreställningen är att andra är överens om frågans svar, eller om att frågan 
kan besvaras, så kan detta dock i allmänhet tänkas leda till att frågan bedöms 
som mer besvarbar. Även andra faktorer än föreställningar om konsensus kan 
naturligtvis tänkas påverka bedömningar av besvarbarhet. När det inte finns 
någon konsensus om frågans svar eller dess besvarbarhet tycks individuella 
skillnader i kunskapssyn, tro på mänskligheten och personlig optimism vara 
relaterade till bedömningarna. Resultaten visar även att det är möjligt att 
skapa en känsla av att ”någon annan vet” även om det troligen inte är så. 
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Resultaten från Studie II tyder på att effekter av föreställningar om konsensus 
kan öka när besvarbarhetsbedömningarna görs i par istället för individuellt.  
Studierna visade även att individuella skillnader i bland annat 
kunskapssyn och optimism kan påverka besvarbarhetsbedömningar. Personer 
med en hög tro på säker kunskap och hög tro på mänsklighetens visade i i 
studie I och III en ökad tro att frågor har svar. Optimister visade en tendens 
att säga att frågan inte kan besvaras idag.  Personlighetsdragen 
Maximeringstendenser (en beslutsfattande stil där personen försöker optimera 
sina val) och ”need for cognition” (en intellektuell tankestil) var relaterad till 
bedömningar av vem (om någon) som kan besvara frågan.  
En relativt ny psykologisk teori, den s.k. construal level theory, handlar 
om bedömningar av ”psykologiskt avstånd”. Denna teori menar att människor 
gör bedömningar av psykologiskt avstånd till, till exempel framtida 
händelser, det geografiska avståndet till en plats, eller det fysiska avståndet 
till en annan människa. Bedömningar av kort psykologiskt avstånd ligger på 
en lägre konstrual level och är mer detaljerade och tydliga, medan en hög 
construal level är mer abstrakt. Construal level theory menar att bedömningar 
av tid till en händelse och avstånd i rummet kan ha gemensam nämnare, 
nämligen psykologiskt avstånd.  Det statistiska sambandet mellan framtida 
besvarbarhet och nutida besvarbarhet som framträdde i studie I, ger stöd för 
att besvarbarhetsbedömningar kan innehålla bedömningar av det 
psykologiska avståndet från det egna självet till det korrekta svaret. 
Resultaten från Studie IV, att vissa människor inte tror att de färger de själva 
ser, inte nödvändigtvis är det korrekta svaret, tyder också på att det 
besvarbarhetsbedömningar kan innehålla flera alternativa bedömningar av 
avståndet från det egna självet till en eller flera alternativa korrekta svar och 
att ytterligare en bedömning som avgör vilket alternativ som är mest troligt. 
Då metakognition förenklat kan beskrivas som tankar om tankar, kan 
bedömningen av vilket alternativ som är mest troligt beskrivas som en 
metakognitiv bedömning.  
Framtida forskning får utvisa om resultaten från denna avhandling kan 
replikeras för andra grupper av människor och för andra frågor. T.ex. vore det 
av intresse att tillämpa det ramverk som byggts upp i denna avhandling för att 
undersöka besvarbarhetsbedömningar i tillämpade sammanhang, t.ex. inom 
vården och hållbar utveckling. Begreppet besvarbarhet kan också ge nya 
perspektiv till grundforskning gällande minne och kognition. Bifynden från 
studie IV, att människor ibland inte tror på de färger de ser visar tydligt på att 
den mänskliga perceptionen inte är en objektiv inspelning av omvärlden. 
Detta väcker grundläggande frågor om relationen mellan seende, tänkande 
och bedömningar av verkligheten. Är själva seendet en bedömning? Och 
innefattar denna bedömning också en bedömning av besvarbarhet som 
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varierar stabilt mellan individer?  Begreppet besvarbarhetsbedömning ger 
viktiga infallsvinklar till såväl grundläggande forskning inom perception, 
kognition som praktiska bedömningar i vardagliga sammanhang i arbetsliv 
och privat.  
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Introduction 
 
Imagine a patient asking a doctor: ‘Will the recommended surgery cure my 
disease?’ The surgery usually succeeds, but complications can occur. Can the 
patient be given a correct, well-argued answer to this question at the time it is 
asked? In court, the most import question is whether the evidence proves a 
person’s guilt ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. But what if the evidence is 
scarce, witnesses disagree, and the defendant is mentally ill? Can the question 
of guilt be given a reasoned, correct answer on the basis of the available 
evidence? In relation to climate, politicians have asked whether researchers 
can provide a correct answer to questions like ‘Is global warming caused by 
humanity?’. The question ‘Is global warming a severe threat for human 
survival on Earth?’ has also been debated.  
Many important questions, asked in the context of individual and 
societal decision making, are difficult to answer. It may also be hard to judge 
whether a correct answer is currently, or will ever be, available to anyone. It 
can also be argued that the nature of all things is uncertain (ontological 
uncertainty) and therefore specific types of questions may be impossible ever 
to answer. It can also be argued that answers may exist, but be out of reach of 
human knowledge (epistemological uncertainty) now or in the future 
(Rescher, 2009). A judgment about whether any person (including oneself) 
could ever answer a question correctly is an answerability judgment1.  
Answerability judgments may be made on an individual, personal level 
for everyday decisions such as ‘Is it possible to repair this?’, ‘Is it safe to use 
a cellphone every day?’, or ‘Is he truly happy?’ Answerability judgments can 
also be made on an organisational or societal level, for instance for questions 
such as: ‘Can this consultancy service help our company?’, ‘Is there a safe 
way to store nuclear waste?’, or ‘How much will the new transportation 
system cost?’ Answerability judgments may include judgments about one’s 
own and other peoples’ current knowledge and competence to answer the 
question considered. Answerability judgments can also concern future 
answerability – whether the question can be answered today or in the future, 
and if in the future, how soon?  
People can be overconfident that they already have the answer to a 
question, and this can sometimes have tragic consequences. For example, 
when pregnant women were prescribed Thalidomide, a medication against 
nausea that caused severe handicaps in their children, the question ‘Does this 
                                                                
1 I use the American spelling judgment (instead of judgement) throughout the thesis 
in order to be consistent with the spelling in the published the articles.  
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medicine have serious side effects?’ was considered answerable (with the 
answer ‘no’) at the time (Westerholm, 2011).  
On the other hand, people can erroneously dismiss or delay ingenious, 
innovative answers to questions because they are not yet accepted as 
reasonable options. For example, in the case of penicillin, it took several 
years from the initial discovery that a certain species of mould could kill 
bacteria to the widespread clinical use of antibiotics (Fleming, 1945). People 
may think that ideas or answers are too unlikely, difficult, or costly to 
develop and therefore give up prematurely. One important reason for these 
premature decisions to give up on finding an answer could be that that 
answerability of the question is judged to be too low.  
Several practical areas could benefit from basic research into question 
answerability (e.g., medical and managerial decision making, climate science, 
and the psychology of innovation and acceptance of new technology). 
Research on answerability judgments can provide increased understanding of 
important social topics such as resistance to public vaccination, climate 
change denial, and why people may choose to believe in ‘alternative facts’ 
instead of scientific consensus. Many situations in which a person or 
organisation considers consulting others for help, advice, or answers are 
likely to include question answerability judgments as an important decision-
making step.  
Answerability judgments may also provide insights into people’s beliefs 
about the veridicality of information on the internet and on social media. 
‘Fake news’ has been much discussed recently and false information can 
spread rapidly on social media. Therefore, it is of interest to investigate how 
people process not only answers, but also the answerability of ambiguous 
questions. The viral photograph of the blue and black (or white and gold) 
Dress, (Dressgate, 2016) is an example of how answerability judgments can 
become part of everyday judgments and decision making.  
The Dress photograph (Figure 1), first posted on the internet in 2015, 
revealed stunning individual differences in colour perception (Lafer-Sousa et 
al., 2015) and beliefs about the correct colours. The pixels in the photograph, 
when analysed separately, were judged to be light blue and brown, but people 
perceived the Dress to be either blue and black or white and gold (Lafer-
Sousa, et al., 2015). Theories about how these differences in perception of the 
colours arose include partly unconscious assumptions about lighting 
conditions when the photograph was taken (Gegenfurtner et al., 2015) and 
differences in cognitive processing in certain areas of the brain (Moccia et al., 
2015; Schlaffke et al., 2015). The debate on social media concerned among 
others: What was the correct answer? Was there even a correct answer?  
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Figure 1. The Dress: blue and black or white and gold? The viral 
phenomenon ‘The Dress’ has its own Wikipedia site (Dressgate, 2016). 
 
Research on answerability judgments is therefore also of interest in 
studying cognitive processing of ambiguous perceptual information. Colour 
judgments about the Dress photograph show the potential fraudulence of 
photographs as sources of information about reality. However, in professional 
and private life, people may often have to rely on mental representations 
elicited by photographs to make important decisions. A medical doctor may 
have an ambiguous X-ray picture to examine, an astronomer a fuzzy 
photograph of Mars, and a criminal investigator an ambiguous image of a 
suspect from a surveillance camera. In all these cases, photographs, which 
may or may not be reliable, could be the basis for judgments about reality. 
The increasing spread of cellphone cameras and public sharing of 
photographs contributes to these kinds of judgments becoming more and 
more common. What would the consequences be if an ambiguous photograph 
of a garment, like the Dress photograph, were evidence in order to identify a 
suspect? Research on the answerability of the question of the colours in the 
Dress may provide some indication of how people deal with ambiguous 
photographic information that is publically shared and discussed. 
Basic research on answerability judgments may also be of interest for 
theoretical development in several areas of psychology related to memory, 
confidence, deception, future intentions, and decision making. This thesis is 
an early attempt to investigate how people judge answerability.  
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What is question answerability?  
 
The idea that some questions are answerable and some are not is taken for 
granted in everyday life and in science. By answerable, I mean the question 
can be answered with a response that is correct, relevant (including being 
specific to an interesting level of granularity), and supported by good 
arguments. Answering ‘Over a year old’ would most likely not be considered 
an interesting answer to the question ‘How old is the oldest person still 
living?’ even though it would be correct. A more interesting answer would be 
‘117 years’. In this context, there are thorny philosophical issues related to 
concepts of truth, knowledge, and uncertainty that have been debated for 
centuries by philosophers and some modern physicists. For example, people 
may disagree about the existence of a correct answer to a particular question 
or to questions in general. The main aim of this thesis is not to solve the issue 
of whether correct answers exist and people are able to articulate them. 
Instead, the aim is to measure people’s beliefs about the existence (or not) of 
correct answers to specific questions, since such judgments are important for 
other judgments and decisions. 
Three questions arise when judging question answerability: (1) Do I know 
the answer myself (or not)? (2) Does someone else know the answer? (or 
not)? and (3) Can someone ever find out, and if so, who and when? When 
judging answerability, people may start by asking themselves ‘Do I know the 
answer?’ When they conclude that they cannot answer a question, they may 
wonder if someone else might know the answer, and if so who would be a 
good person to turn to. Thus, answerability judgments are relevant when 
people consider consulting others for the answer. Consultations about 
personal decisions can include medical counselling or asking a friend for 
advice; businesses and other organisations may hire professional consultants 
to advise them.  
A question can be judged as more or less answerable based on how much 
effort it takes to answer it. A person may judge a question to be 
unanswerable, even in the future, because of the overwhelming complexity of 
the potential answer or a logical impossibility in the question itself, such as, 
‘What is an example of a problem that will never be considered by any 
human being?’ (Rescher, 2009, p. 41).  
The concept of an ‘answerable question’ has been used in the scientific 
literature. For example, ‘answerable clinical question’ is used in evidence-
based practice (e.g., Elstein, 2004; Fineout-Overholt & Johnston, 2005; 
Houston & Kaatz, 2006; Sestini, 2010; Shaneyfelt et al., 2006), but to my 
knowledge there is no research investigating all three aspects of answerability 
judgments mentioned above (Do I know? Does someone else know? Can 
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somebody find out?). The four studies in this thesis are to my knowledge 
among the first to investigate judgments of question answerability in a broad 
sense. 
  
Judging answerability: a creative process and a 
metacognitive judgment 
 
To connect answerability judgments to previous research in psychology and 
to have a decent starting point for conducting research, it is important to 
classify what kind of judgment an answerability judgment is. The process 
leading to an answerability judgment can be classified in different, partially 
overlapping ways.  
One perspective, following Busemeyer and Bruza (2012), considers 
answerability judgment, and human judgment in general, to be a creative 
process. Creative processes include both divergent tasks, aimed to generate as 
many original solutions to a problem as possible, and convergent tasks, aimed 
to identify one specific solution (Guilford, 1956). When facing a difficult 
question, generating as many original answer options as possible may be 
considered a divergent task. Selecting a preferred choice according to certain 
method may be considered a convergent task. Divergent and convergent 
processes have been associated with different types of brain activity (Jauk, 
Benedek, & Neubauer, 2012), so answerability judgments considered as 
creative processes are complex combinations of several different cognitive 
processes. 
With new knowledge, beliefs about both the answer and the answerability 
of a question may alter with the changed decision frame of the question. The 
decision frame, as defined by Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1985) includes 
the formulation of the problem and the contingencies associated with it. One 
important contingency could be what answer alternatives are known on the 
question topic. Adding a previously unknown option may change both the 
preferred answer and the answerability of the question.  
In consumer research, it has been suggested that the relationship between 
available alternatives can influence a person towards making a no-choice 
decision because they are unwilling to choose between any of the available 
alternatives (Dhar, 1997). When a question is not considered answerable with 
scientific knowledge, one reason may be the relationship between the answer 
alternatives. Consider for example the question, ‘Is there life anywhere in the 
universe other than on Earth?’ Let us assume that a person believes this 
question is impossible to answer. Let us further assume that the same person 
hears the next day that a satellite has captured photographic evidence of 
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living micro-organisms on Mars. Faced with the new answer option, ‘Yes, 
micro-organisms have been spotted on Mars’, the person may change the 
answerability the question from ‘It is not possible to answer’ to ‘Yes, it is 
possible to answer, since life has been found on Mars’. 
Answerability judgments could also, at least partly, be regarded as 
metacognitive judgments since they involve ‘one’s knowledge concerning 
one’s own cognitive processes or anything related to them’ (Flavell’s general 
definition of metacognition, 1976, p. 232). According to Flavell (1976, p. 
907): 
 
Metacognitive knowledge consists primarily of knowledge or beliefs 
about what factors or variables act and interact in what ways to affect 
the course and outcome of cognitive enterprises. There are three major 
categories of these factors or variables—person, task, and strategy.  
 
These three metacognitive aspects are illustrated below. When the task is 
judging answerability, a person may consider who might know the answer to 
the question. For natural reasons people may start with themselves, asking 
‘Do I know the answer?’ When faced with a question, a person may initially 
feel that they know the correct answer, even though they have not (yet) 
recalled or computed it. Reder and Ritter (1992) defined meta-knowledge as 
‘how people determine what they know about a question before they actually 
answer it’ (Reder & Ritter, 1992, p. 435).  
A person may also recall several possible answers and consider which 
one, if any, might be correct. Consider the question ‘Which flower is called 
Anemone Nemorosa in Latin?’ A person familiar with Latin flower names 
may be unsure whether the answer is wood anemone or blue anemone, but 
that person may believe that someone else, a biologist perhaps, would know 
the correct answer. This brings us to the second and third aspects of Flavell’s 
(1976) metacognitive knowledge: ‘Does someone else know? (Who knows?)’ 
and ‘Can someone find out?’ When considering whether someone else 
knows, people may think about who could be knowledgeable or how the 
knowledge could be acquired. A person could also consider whether answers 
provided by experts in the field are credible and certain (e.g., Anderegg, 
Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Broomell & Bodilly Kane, 2017). These 
considerations can also be regarded as metacognitive, since they include 
thoughts about the cognitions and knowledge of other people (Efklides & 
Misailidi, 2010; Flavell, 1976; Jost, Kruglanski, & Nelson, 1998). 
 
 7 
 
Previous research 
 
I have found no research focused precisely on answerability as defined 
above. However, much related research has investigated aspects of 
answerability judgments such as ‘Do I know (or not)?’, ‘Does somebody else 
know (or not)?’, and ‘Can someone find out (or not)?’ Much of such research 
has investigated questions with a consensus about an answer; this thesis 
contributes by including questions lacking a consensus about the correct 
answer.  
Although no research describes answerability judgments exactly as 
defined above, several studies touched on the concept of answerability. 
Research in forensic psychology has studied participants’ ability to 
distinguish questions on ‘information not seen’ in a video clip (e.g., Buratti, 
MacLeod, & Allwood, 2014; Candel, Memon, & Al-Harazi, 2007; Frey & 
Scoboria, 2012; Roebers, von der Linden, Schneider, & Howie, 2007; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Kirsch, 2008), which are considered unanswerable, 
from (answerable) questions about information shown in the video. The 
results suggest that it is generally difficult for people to separate what they 
have seen from what they have not and to distinguish between an answerable 
and an unanswerable question. Other research suggests there may be 
individual differences in making such judgments. Frey and Scoboria (2012) 
proposed that people may vary in their ability to separate what they have seen 
from what they have not seen, and denoted that ability skill. Frey and 
Scoboria (2012) also considered ‘I don’t know’ to be the correct answer 
when participants had not seen the information themselves.  
When people say they do not know the answer to a question, this can 
mean several things, including that the question is not possible for them or 
anyone else to answer. ‘Don’t know’ judgments have been studied by several 
researchers (e.g., Glucksberg and McCloskey, 1981; Hampton, Aina, 
Andersson, Mirza, & Parmar, 2012; Kolers and Palef, 1976; Scoboria et al., 
2008).  
Glucksberg and McCloskey (1981) concluded that when people attempt to 
answer a question, they first search their memory to identify facts that may be 
relevant, and then further consider such facts (if found) in detail to assess 
whether they can be used to answer the question. Hampton et al. (2012) 
investigated whether people were consistent in their beliefs about ‘known 
unknowns’, things they were aware that they did not know. The results 
showed that people were consistently aware that they did not know some 
facts for sure, suggesting that they considered some questions less 
answerable, at least by themselves. 
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Another line of research concerns beliefs about certainty and uncertainty 
of knowledge (in particular domains or in general). Research on this topic has 
mainly been conducted in the field of educational psychology (e.g., Hofer 
and Pintrich, 2002; Scharrer, Britt, Stadtler, & Bromme, 2013, 2014; 
Shtulman, 2013), but also in risk research (Bammer & Smithson, 2009; 
Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011) and in debated areas of knowledge 
such as climate science (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Kahan, 
et al., 2012).  
This line of research suggests there may be individual differences, as well 
as group differences in beliefs about the (un)certainty of knowledge. It also 
points to the importance of socially prevalent beliefs. For example, Kahan et 
al. (2011, 2012) suggest that people choose to believe the opinions of others 
with whom they share the same values, for example, members of the same 
political party. Furthermore, Shtulman (2013, p. 207) found that supernatural 
questions were treated the same as scientific questions in terms of their 
veridicality. Social consensus about a belief was clearly related to confidence 
that the answer was correct regardless of whether the belief was supernatural 
or scientific (Shtulman, 2013). People may also sometimes believe that 
scientific knowledge is limited and insufficient to provide quality answers to 
important questions concerning such things as nuclear risks (Sjöberg, 2001). 
 
 
 
Factors related to question answerability 
 
Many psychological factors can be related to, or influence, judgments of 
question answerability. Below I describe several factors focused on in this 
thesis. The aim is not to provide a complete list of all factors that might 
influence or be associated with answerability judgments, but to outline the 
ones most relevant to the four studies reported below: socially prevalent 
knowledge, discussion with others, domain-specific contextual associations, 
previous experience, previous beliefs, and recent knowledge activation. Some 
variables on individual difference were also investigated and will be 
described.  
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Social influence  
 
Socially prevalent knowledge 
  
In general, memories, cognition, and knowledge are distributed throughout a 
society and globally; no one can know everything, and humanity’s 
understanding develops continuously (Atran, Medin & Ross, 2005; Perkins, 
1993; Sloman & Rabb, 2016; Sparrow, Liu & Wegner, 2011). Therefore, 
people often need to rely on others’ knowledge.  
The ‘wisdom of the crowd’ phenomenon (e.g., Surowiecki, 2004) 
suggests it may be rational to consider answers from many different people, 
since the general tendency of these answers often turns out to be correct. 
However, the wisdom of the crowd assumes a suitable match between the 
crowd and the question. A large group of two-year olds may not on average 
estimate time correctly, for example. Collective or ‘communal’ ignorance 
(Faber, Manstetten, & Proops, 1992) may also mean that an incorrect 
consensus view sometimes becomes a ‘misleading star’ (Lorenz, Rauhut, 
Schweitzer & Helbing, 2010) as people put their faith into collective ideas 
even when they are incorrect (Asch, 1956; Koriat, 2008). 
In everyday life, people collaborate in groups and meetings, in families 
and in business (e.g., people make decisions both as individuals and as 
members of groups). However, even when making decisions individually, 
memories and beliefs about what others may think can affect a person’s 
memory and judgment (e.g., Fein, Goethals & Kugler, 2007; Gabbert, 
Memon & Allan, 2003; Hoffman, Granhag, Kwong See & Loftus, 2001). If, 
for example, a person’s friends agree that a certain brand of camera is 
superior, a person may take that into consideration when wondering ‘What 
camera is the best to purchase?’ The perception that a question has been 
answered correctly implies (or is inferred to mean) that the question is 
answerable, so other people’s (perceived) agreement on the answer to the 
question may be used as a cue when judging the answerability of a question. 
This is one way other people’s opinions may be important in judgments about 
question answerability in everyday life. In Pre-study 1 (reported in Appendix 
C) we also examined people’s beliefs about the consensus on whether the 
questions used in Studies I, II, and III were answerable.   
Koriat (2012) showed that people are more confident in their answers 
when they agree with the majority. I will refer to this reliance on or adoption 
of the view of the perceived majority in a certain context as a ‘consensus 
effect’. It should be noted that I use the word consensus in a broad sense to 
mean not necessarily an actual consensus, but what may be more important, a 
person’s beliefs about what other people agree upon. The consensus effect 
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has also been described in research on conformity (e.g., Bond, & Smith, 
1996; Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; Nolan, Wesley Schultz, Cialdini, Goldstein, 
& Griskevicius, 2008; van Cappellen, Cornelle, Cols & Saroglou, 2011).  
If common views have a general (but fallible) tendency to be correct, the 
strategy of believing what others believe should help the individual save 
cognitive effort while still reaching a correct answer. Thus, people who 
believe there is an overall commonly held idea about the answerability of the 
question are likely adapt to that view. A person cannot consider every detail 
of every single issue or consider all potential risks. Therefore, if most people 
consider cellphones relatively risk-free, it makes sense to spend less time 
worrying about their potential hazards than if others show misgivings and 
fear about their use. If this reasoning is correct, the trend to follow the 
consensus may also be reflected in the individual’s somewhat automatic 
memory processes when judging a question’s answerability.  
In some cases, it is important to note a person’s beliefs about what 
relevant others think or about what constitutes a reliable consensus. People’s 
beliefs about consensus and the groups they consider relevant to the question 
may vary (Kahan et al., 2011). The impact of a belief about the consensus 
may also be strengthened by the repetition of an answerability judgment by 
several different individuals. Repeated statements are often perceived to be 
truer, in what has been called the repetition effect or the truth effect 
(Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2010). Dechêne et al. (2010) and 
Unkelbach, Bayer, Alves, Koch, and Stahl (2011) argued that one reason for 
the repetition effect is the metacognitive experience of ease, or processing 
fluency, while making a judgment with considerable corroboration. 
Processing fluency can be elicited by the ease of retrieving a correct answer. 
Because repeated items are more easily retrieved, relying on consensus can 
also be associated with fluency. The repetition effect is a robust phenomenon 
with respect to presentation, duration, and modality (Dechêne et al., 2010). 
Even a repeated finding of nothing can be convincing. For example, if a 
person is aware that many people have been unsuccessful in finding an 
answer to a question, they may decide that an answer simply does not exist 
(Hahn & Oaksford, 2007).  
Because people’s beliefs about consensus are likely to affect their 
answerability judgments, I compared consensus questions with non-
consensus questions (in Studies I, II, and III). By consensus questions, I mean 
questions that most people believe relevant others agree are answerable by 
someone, if not themselves. Non-consensus questions are those for which 
there is no consensus among relevant others about answerability of the 
question. Under some circumstances it can be relevant to separate beliefs 
about consensus on the correct answer from consensus about the question’s 
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answerability. For example, when considering the future answerability of a 
question, there may be consensus that the question will someday be 
answerable, while there is not yet a consensus about that answer will be. 
 
Discussion with others 
 
As answerability judgments depend on the processing of the answerability 
judgment task, such judgments may depend on whether the task is carried out 
alone or with other people. This was investigated in Study II. When 
comparing the conditions for information processing between individuals and 
pairs, two differences emerged as relevant. First, pairs were more likely to 
have more knowledge than individuals. Second, because they have more 
knowledge, when pairs collaborated on a judgment, they were likely to have 
more, and more diverse, memory cues than a single person making a 
judgment, simply because they have access to two minds instead of one. Pairs 
therefore seem to have access to a broader range of arguments than 
individuals. Since the pair members have to understand each other, one may 
also suspect that their communication may be more systematic and less 
intuitive than an individual’s thinking (and think-aloud protocol) since 
individuals have only themselves to understand. (In Study II, individuals 
were asked to think aloud and this may have had the effect of making their 
thinking feel somewhat more social.)  
However, although pairs and groups may statistically have access to more 
varied arguments, this may be limited by their tendency to the discuss their 
shared knowledge more than their individual knowledge (Lu, Yuan, & 
McLeod, 2012). The focus on discussing common knowledge can lead to 
pairs judging questions with a high expected consensus as more answerable 
than individuals. A lack of common knowledge may also lead to pairs 
judging a question as less answerable. In general, pairs’ answerability 
judgments may be more influenced by consensus effects than those of 
individuals, since discussion may make consensus (or lackthereof) more 
salient (e.g., Koriat, 2012; Koriat & Adiv, 2012). Thus, a group or a pair 
confronted with an answerability task has at least two types of consensus to 
consider: present consensus between group members and referred consensus 
– individual group members’ beliefs about consensus among people not 
present (e.g., socially prevalent knowledge as described above). 
It seems reasonable that when the present consensus and the referred 
consensus of significant other groups appear to fit an opinion may be more 
likely to be considered correct. For example, if friends, scientists, and co-
workers all seem to agree that a question is answerable, the perceived truth of 
that statement may increase because it is repeated across groups.  
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Contextual associations 
 
Domain-specific associations 
 
Several researchers have suggested that individuals have preconceptions 
about knowledge in different domains (e.g., Stahl & Bromme, 2007). Stahl 
and Bromme (2007) suggested that these ‘domain-specific certainty beliefs’ 
act as a lens through which an individual makes judgments of knowledge 
(Bromme, Pieschl, & Stahl, 2010). Reder and Ritter (1992) suggested that the 
feeling of knowing an answer may be based on a shallow processing of the 
wording of the question. They argued that an initial feeling of knowing was 
based more on familiarity with the question items than with the answers.  
In Study I, we speculated that many participants may have pre-
conceptions (possibly derived from school education) that questions in 
computational domains such as geometry, measurement units, mechanics, or 
physics are always asked in a way that allows an answer to be calculated. We 
therefore believed that it might be possible to create a ‘feeling of others 
knowing’ (or others being able to compute) the answer, even when the 
computational question was manipulated to omit crucial information, thereby 
creating an illusion of answerability. 
 
 
Recent knowledge activation 
 
Previous research has shown that reflection upon one’s own knowledge 
before making confidence judgments can make people less confident that 
they know the correct answer (Allwood & Granhag, 1996). At the same time, 
people under some circumstances tend to be more confident in a friend’s 
overall knowledge than in their own (Johansson & Allwood, 2007). This 
prior research suggested it would be interesting to study whether 
answerability judgments are affected by recent knowledge activation (e.g., 
when reflecting about one’s own knowledge of the question). This question 
was explored in Study III.  
 
 
Individual differences 
 
People are likely to differ in their judgments on answerability, and it is 
therefore of interest to investigate the relation between individual differences 
and answerability judgments. According to Mohammed and Schwall (2009) 
individual differences matter most when questions are surrounded by 
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uncertainty, and they may therefore be of special interest for questions with 
no consensus about answerability. The concept of individual difference is 
used here in a broad sense and includes, among other factors, optimism and 
general beliefs about knowledge and knowing. The term ‘individual 
difference’ may or may not be an apt choice to describe such variation, 
however, since optimism and beliefs may alter over time with new 
experiences, previous beliefs, and education. However, the main purpose was 
not to describe and search for individual traits, but to investigate individual 
variation that is stable enough over time to affect other judgments.  
A common opinion, supported by much research, holds that previous 
cognitions act as a base for subsequent judgments (see e.g., Busemeyer & 
Bruza, 2012). Moreover, people often act to preserve their previous opinions 
by interpreting information in a way that confirms their personal view, 
resulting in confirmation bias, (e.g., Nickerson & Raymond, 1998). For 
example, a person who believes a drug has no side effects will be more 
willing to believe studies reporting there are no side effects (Hahn & 
Oaksford, 2007), while another, who suspects side effects and reads the same 
studies showing no side effects, may conclude that the question is not 
answerable, since there may be side effects that the studies do not show. 
Because such beliefs can change with new experiences or for other reasons, 
they may not be considered traits, but may still be stable enough over time to 
influence answerability judgments (e.g., a person who does not believe in 
side effects may change that belief after experiencing them.). 
Cognitions can generally be more abstract or more concrete, and this may 
be relevant in judgments about answerability. For instance, people can have 
abstract beliefs about the side effects of drugs in general and concrete beliefs 
about the specific side effect(s) of a particular drug. Specific, concrete beliefs 
based on experiences may affect more abstract general beliefs. For example, 
experiencing the side effects of one drug can affect the general belief that 
certain kinds of drugs have side effects. More general beliefs can also colour 
judgments on specific topics. Schuman and Presser (1996) demonstrated that 
a general belief affected judgments on a question when participants were 
undecided and had no opinion on the specific topic. When Americans were 
asked whether Russian and Arab leaders were working for peace and 
compelled to give an opinion other than their preferred ‘I do not know’, their 
judgments were affected by their general beliefs about world leaders working 
for peace. It is also possible, especially when individuals have no previous 
strong opinions about a question, that their general beliefs can be applied to 
their judgment of whether a specific question is answerable.  
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Epistemic measures 
 
Belief in certainty of knowledge  
 
General beliefs about certainty in knowledge may be especially important for 
judging question answerability. Such beliefs have been researched in 
educational psychology (e.g., DeBacker, Crowson, Beesley, Thoma, & 
Hestevold, 2008; Kardash & Scholes, 1996). The term epistemic beliefs refers 
to personal beliefs about knowledge and knowing (Schommer, 1990).  
One dimension of epistemic beliefs relevant to question answerability is 
the belief in ‘certain knowledge’,which has been addressed by many 
researchers (e.g., Bråten & Strømsø, 2005; Clarebout, Elen, Luyten, & 
Bamps, 2001; Schraw, Bendixen, & Dunkle, 2002). In this literature it is 
assumed that development goes from a black-and-white perspective in 
childhood, when knowledge is seen as certain and distributed by an authority, 
to a more relative view in which certain answers may be out of human reach 
(Elby & Hammer, 2000; Perry, 1970). In this literature, global certainty 
beliefs are separated from domain-specific certainty beliefs (e.g., Khine, 
2008). Global certainty beliefs concern knowledge in general, while domain-
specific beliefs refer to beliefs about certainty of knowledge in a particular 
discipline. Henceforth when referring to certainty beliefs I mean global 
certainty beliefs.  
Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000) found in their research with 
children that epistemological understanding is something that develops over 
time. ‘Initially, the objective dimension of knowledge may dominate to the 
exclusion of subjectivity; subsequently, the subjective dimension dominates 
and the objective is abandoned, and, finally, the two are coordinated’. Kuhn 
et al. (2000) suggested that these phases apply to any cognitive development 
in any domain, but are also global properties of cognitive development. It is 
reasonable to assume that a person with a strong belief in certainty of 
knowledge would be more prone to believe that questions have answers. In 
line with Schuman and Presser’s (1996) example showing how general 
beliefs affect specific questions, it is possible that the effect of these beliefs 
will be heightened on issues where no previous strong opinion has been 
formed.  
Trautwein and Lüdtke (2007) investigated whether beliefs in certainty of 
knowledge could predict the perceived certainty of different theories (e.g., the 
‘big bang’ theory) but found only weak correlations between general beliefs 
in certainty of knowledge and beliefs about certainty in these theories. 
However, the weakness in those correlations may partly originate in the fact 
that participants already had formed strong opinions on the topics. Most of 
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the theories used as stimuli material were rated high in familiarity by the 
participants. Using regression analysis, Trautwein and Lüdtke (2007) found 
that familiarity increased the certainty belief in the theory. I describe more 
theories about how familiarity may affect answerability under the heading 
‘Previous experience’ below.  
 
 
Mankind’s knowledge 
 
Another epistemological issue that may affect question answerability is 
belief(s) about the limitations and usefulness of mankind’s knowledge. 
Sjöberg suggested for example that ‘people believe that there are clear limits 
to what science and experts know’ (2001, p. 189). Munro (2010) also showed 
that personal beliefs that diverge from scientific consensus can make people 
doubt whether a question is scientifically answerable. Since we knew of no 
available measure of beliefs about mankind’s knowledge, we developed 
items in Study II for that purpose. 
 
Mankind’s efficacy 
  
Another kind of individual epistemological belief is about mankind’s 
efficacy, that is, our ability to reach epistemic goals (e.g., answering a 
question). It is reasonable to expect that high ratings of mankind’s knowledge 
and ’s efficacy will be associated with higher answerability ratings. As with 
mankind’s knowledge, no validated measure was available for mankind’s 
efficacy, so we created a measure for Study I by paraphrasing items from the 
self-efficacy scale (Löve, Moore, & Hensing, 2012). 
 
Maximisation Tendency 
 
Maximising is a decision-making style used to find and select the very 
best alternative rather than one that is ‘good enough’. Maximisers tend to be 
willing to spend great effort to find the optimal solution to a problem 
(Schwartz et al., 2002). However, not every problem or question can be given 
maximum resources. Consequently, maximisers may feel that their own 
reasoning would be insufficient for some questions and they may therefore 
choose to rely on other people who have spent more time considering the 
issue. In terms of answerability, this would mean that maximisers would tend 
to more than others to believe that someone other than themselves knows the 
answer. This is in line with findings reported by Parker, Bruine de Bruin, and 
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Fischhoff (2007), which showed that maximisers tend to avoid decision 
making and to depend on others.    
Epistemic preference 
 
People may also have different epistemic styles. Some people may be 
more inclined to voluntarily reflect on philosophical issues, while others may 
have a more pragmatic style. The measure EPI-r was developed to investigate 
epistemic style (Elphinstone, Farrugia, Critchley, & Eigenberger, 2014). 
There are two kinds of epistemic preferences measured on the EPI-r. The first 
is deeper intellectual processing measured on EPI-r Intellectual scale (e.g., 
‘In the simplest terms, I have a strong need to study just how and why things 
happen’), and the second is more automatic default processing measured on 
the EPI-r Default scale (e.g., ‘When confronting the deep philosophical issues 
of life, I am more inclined to just deal with it, get the job done, and move 
on’). We expected that participants with a preference for intellectual 
processing would have lower answerability judgments than those who scored 
higher on the Default scale since we thought intellectualisers would 
problematise the questions more. We also expected that participants with 
default processing preferences would choose the easiest answerable 
interpretation and would therefore find more questions answerable, since 
unanswerable questions could be considered too demanding to spend time 
thinking about.  
 
Need for cognition 
 
The need for cognition is a cognitive style that may be associated with 
answerability judgments. People with a high need for cognition enjoy 
difficult and effortful cognitive tasks (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Need 
for cognition is also associated with fluid intelligence, which can be 
considered an important asset in creative thinking (Fleischhauser et al., 
2010). When faced with a difficult question, people with a high need for 
cognition may elaborate it more thoroughly and in ways people with a low 
need for cognition would not. Because they may elaborate difficult questions, 
people with a higher need for cognition may also be more able to identify 
uncertainties and more accepting of the alternative that some questions are 
not possible to answer.  
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Optimism 
 
Finally, optimism may also affect answerability judgments. People with 
generalised optimism tend to interpret things positively and are less likely to 
give up (Carver, Scheier, Miller, & Fulford, 2009; Muhonen & Torkelson, 
2005). It is therefore likely that optimists are more prone to believe that 
answers exist and can be found if the search for them continues. On the other 
hand, optimists expect good things to happen in uncertain times (Monzani, 
Steca, & Greco, 2014) and this could lead to their better tolerance of 
uncertainty. Optimists may therefore be more comfortable with uncertainty 
and more willing to accept that answers to questions may be uncertain or 
non-existent. Optimism is an interesting phenomenon and different features 
of it seem theoretically related to answerability in different ways; therefore, 
optimism is worth further research in relation to question answerability, even 
if (or perhaps especially because) it is not evident what results may emerge.   
 
Previous experience and previous beliefs  
 
People may also differ in their previous beliefs about the specific 
question, and previous experience of the question or the topic is also likely to 
affect their answerability judgments. Previous experience of a question is 
associated with more familiarity, which may create a feeling of knowing the 
answer (Reder & Ritter 1992). Furthermore, familiar theories, such as 
familiar answers to difficult questions, are considered more certain than less 
familiar ideas (Trautwein & Lüdtke, 2007). In Study IV, we investigated the 
effect of previous experience of an ambiguous colour judgment, assuming 
that familiarity would lead to a higher belief that there is a correct answer and 
that less experience would be associated with the belief that the question is 
not answerable. 
 
 
Measuring answerability 
 
Because answerability judgments may be multi-faceted, different ways have 
been used to ask about answerability.  
In Studies I and II, the answerability of questions today was investigated 
on a current answerability scale (Figure 2). In these studies, answerability 
was presented as a matter of degree and measured on a percentage scale. In 
Study I, answerability today was compared with beliefs about when an 
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answer might be found in the future, measured on a future answerability 
scale, also called the future scale (Figure 2). The future scale, the belief that a 
question is unanswerable, that it will never be answerable, was also an 
option. In Study II, the current answerability scale from Study I was also 
used. In Study III, we designed an option-scale (Option Scale 1) to separate 
beliefs about who knew the answers. As shown in Figure 2, this scale 
included ‘I know’, ‘Somebody else knows’, and ‘Nobody knows’ options. In 
Study IV, answerability was measured for a question about a photograph 
widely circulated on the internet, which prompted debate about the correct 
colour of ‘The Dress’. In Studies I, II, and III, instructions explained the 
concept of answerability to the participants. In Study IV, a popular wording 
for low answerability, ‘There is no correct answer’, was used in another 
option scale (Option Scale 2).  
 
 
Current answerability scale used in Studies I and II 
Cannot be                               Can be  
answered                              answered 
correctly by a                              correctly by a 
now living person                         now living person 
(0%)                                                              (100%)  
   0         10         20         30          40          50          60         70          80         90         100    
Future answerability scale used in Study I  
Can be 
answered  
today  
by me  
(and maybe 
someone 
else) 
Can be 
answered  
today by 
someone 
else (but  
not by me) 
Can be 
answered  
within 
one year 
Can be 
answered  
within 10 
years 
Can be 
answered  
within 
20 years 
Can be 
answered  
within 
50 years 
Can be 
answered  
within 
100 years 
Can be 
answered  
within  
200 years  
Can be 
answered 
after 200 
years 
Can  
never be 
answered 
Option scale 1 used in Study III 
A. I know, the answer is ________________________ 
B. Someone else knows. 
C. Nobody knows. 
Option scale 2 used in Study IV 
Blue and black 
White and gold  
Others, namely____ 
There is no correct answer.  
Figure 2. The answerability scales used in Studies I, II, III, and IV.  
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Aim 
 
The overall aim of this thesis was to explore, understand and highlight 
different aspects of question answerability judgments.  
 
The four studies in this thesis deal with five main questions: 
 
1. How can different forms of answerability judgment be measured?  
2. Are some types of questions perceived to be more answerable than 
others?  
3. How are question answerability judgments affected by social influence? 
4. How are different contextual associations associated to answerability 
judgments?  
5. Are individual differences related to question answerability judgments? 
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Summary of empirical studies 
 
Introduction  
 
The four empirical studies (Studies I -IV) in this thesis investigated question 
answerability from different perspectives by varying and measuring different 
factors that may be related to judgments about answerability: Social 
influence, Contextual differences, and Individual differences. 
There were five research questions. The first, How can different forms of 
answerability judgments be measured? was investigated in all studies. The 
second, Are some types of questions perceived to be more answerable than 
others? was investigated in Studies I, II, and III. The third, How are question 
answerability judgments affected by social influence? and fourth, How are 
different contextual associations associated to answerability judgments? 
were explored all studies. Finally, Are individual differences related to 
question answerability judgments? was explored in Studies I, III, and IV. In 
addition to these main questions, we also explored the possibility of creating 
‘a feeling of others knowing’ in Study I.  
In the studies, we used different formats of the answerability question. In 
Studies I and II we explored judged current answerability on a percent scale. 
Current answerability, that is if the question is answerable today, was 
compared to answerability in the future in Study I. In Study III we provided 
‘I know’ and ‘someone else knows’ from ‘nobody knows’. In Study IV we 
suggested alternatives, including the answer ‘There is no correct answer’.  
 
General method 
 
In Studies I, II, and III questions with an expected high consensus concerning 
their answer were called consensus questions (e.g., What is the name of our 
galaxy?). The answerability judgments of these questions were compared to 
questions with low expected consensus about an answer (henceforth called 
non-consensus questions; for example: How many galaxies are there in the 
universe?). Study IV focused on one question, a non-consensus question. In 
Study I, an additional question category was used. This question category 
was denoted illusion questions (e.g., How large is the area of an ellipse, with 
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a minor axis of 2 cm?2). In this category, crucial information needed to 
compute the answer to the question was absent. For an overview of the 
studies, see Table 1. 
 
General material  
 
Answerability questionnaires 
 
In Studies I, II, and III we defined and instructed participants that by an 
answerable question we meant one that has a relevant, correct, and 
reasonably precise and complete answer, and for which strong and reasonable 
arguments can be made to support that answer.   
First, we created a battery of 50 generic questions. Question items were 
created by the researchers or selected from a large sample of generated 
questions. This resulted in a battery of 26 consensus, 20 non-consensus, and 4 
illusion questions (see Appendix A). These questions were explored and 
validated in two pre-studies (the pre-studies are reported in Appendix C). A 
subset of the original 50 questions was used in Study I. A subset of the 
questions (and some new questions) was used in Study II. All 46 of the 
consensus and non-consensus questions from the original 50 were used in 
Study III. 
In Study IV, participants could freely interpret the meaning of the 
alternative ‘There is no correct answer’, but the researchers interpreted that 
alternative to mean that the participant did not believe the question was 
answerable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
2 To compute the area of an ellipse you also need information about the major axis.  
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Table 1.  Overview of empirical Studies I, II, III, and IV 
 
Study 
(N)  
Type of 
question 
Individual 
difference 
measures 
Scale Method Design 
I 
(476) 
General 
knowledge 
questions:  
8 consensus 
2 illusion 
12 non-
consensus 
 
Certainty 
Beliefs  
(2 items) 
 
Epistemic 
Preference 
 
Mankind’s 
efficacy 
 
Optimism  
 
Mankind’s 
knowledge 
 
Current 
(percent),  
Future  
(time) 
Web survey  
 
Study I. Two 
order conditions: 
Certainty beliefs 
first or Certainty 
beliefs last.  
II 
(91) 
General 
knowledge 
questions:  
4 consensus 
16 non-
consensus 
 
 Current 
(percent) 
Paper and pen 
questionnaire  
Think aloud, 
Pair discussion 
Two groups: 
Questions 
answered 
individually 
(Think aloud)  
or in pairs 
(Group 
discussion) 
III 
(123) 
General 
knowledge 
questions:  
26 consensus  
20 non-
consensus 
 
Certainty 
Beliefs  
(4 items) 
 
Maximi-
zation 
tendencies 
 
Need for 
cognition 
 
Options  
(option 
scale 2) 
 
Paper and pen 
questionnaire  
 
Two groups:  
Randomised to 
knowledge 
ratings before 
judging 
answerability 
and control 
condition 
IV 
(186) 
Colour 
question: 
1 non-
consensus,  
 
Optimism 
(Lot-r) 
Options  
(option 
scale 1) 
Web survey  
 
Two groups: 
seen or not seen 
The Dress 
before 
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Study I 
 
Purpose 
 
The two most important purposes of Study I was to compare consensus and 
non-consensus questions on answerability today and in the future. We also 
wanted to investigate how individual differences were related to the 
answerability judgments. In addition, we openly explored if an “illusion of 
answerability” could be created.  
 
Method 
 
Study I was performed by means of a web survey with 476 participants from 
research pools at the University of Gothenburg. The participants were asked 
to judge the answerability of 22 questions (8 consensus, 12 non-consensus, 
and 2 illusion). Approximately half of the participants were randomised to 
judge if the questions were answerable by anyone today using a current 
answerability scale variant. The other half of the participants was randomised 
to judging answerability in the future on the future answerability scale 
variant (Figure 2 shows the two scales). All participants judged questions on 
certainty beliefs, mankind’s efficacy, mankind’s knowledge (Items are shown 
in Appendix B), optimism (Lot-r) and epistemic preference (Epi-r). 
Within each scale variant the order of the question blocks was varied, 
constituting two order conditions. In the first order condition participants 
rated certainty beliefs first, thereafter, answerability questions and finally the 
other measures in randomised order. In the second order condition 
participants rated the answerability questions first, then the other measures in 
randomised order and finally epistemic beliefs.    
 
 
Hypotheses and questions 
 
Hypothesis (1). Consensus questions would be rated higher in 
answerability than non-consensus questions.  
Hypothesis (2-6). We believed individual differences would matter more 
for non-consensus questions. We expected the higher scores on measures 
concerning epistemic issues (i.e. certainty beliefs, epistemic default 
processing, mankind’s efficacy and mankind’s knowledge) to be positively 
related to higher answerability judgment scores. 
Explorative questions: The potential relationship between optimism and 
answerability was explored.  Also the relation between answerability today 
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and answerability in the future was explored, by comparing the two scale 
variants. In addition, answerability ratings of the illusion questions were 
openly explored. 
 
Results 
 
Our first hypothesis was confirmed. Consensus questions were judged more 
answerable than non-consensus questions.  
Current answerability: We did not find any significant differences, in 
current answerability between the participants rating beliefs in certainty of 
knowledge first or last. Therefore, these results were analysed on an 
aggregated basis for the current answerability scale. The hypothesis about 
individual differences and answerability was partly confirmed. Mankind’s 
efficacy and certainty of knowledge were correlated with higher current 
answerability. Optimism was correlated to higher usage of “cannot be 
answered today” on the current answerability scale variant for non-
consensus questions 
Future answerability: When judging future answerability, the results for 
the non-consensus questions differed slightly depending on whether certainty 
beliefs were rated before or after the judgment. The participants who rated 
certainty beliefs before rating the non-consensus questions on the future 
answerability scale rated these questions to be possible to answer in a more 
distant future than the participants who rated epistemic beliefs items after 
their answerability judgments. Therefore the future answerability judgments 
in Study I were analysed on both aggregated level (all question types 
together) and in addition, the non-consensus questions were analysed 
separately for the two order conditions.  
On an aggregated level, for all question types and order conditions, 
individuals scoring high on the scales belief in certainty of knowledge, 
mankind’s efficacy, and mankind’s knowledge used the alternative “can 
never be answered” less frequently.  Higher scores on mankind’s knowledge 
and mankind’s efficacy were correlated to rating the non-consensus questions 
more answerable in the near future. When belief in certainty of knowledge 
was rated before future answerability, the correlation between future 
answerability and the variables mankind’s efficacy and mankind’s knowledge 
was stronger.  
The future answerability ratings were highly correlated with current 
answerability ratings. Thus, questions that were rated to be less answerable 
today were rated to be answered in a more distant future (or never to be 
possible to answer). Illusion questions were rated quite high in answerability, 
but had a larger standard deviation than consensus questions. Rating the 
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illusion questions as more answerable in the future was correlated to higher 
ratings of mankind’s knowledge and lower ratings of EPI-intellectual style. 
There were no correlations between the individual difference measures and 
the consensus questions.   
 
Study II 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of this study was to compare the answerability judgments of 
individuals and pairs for consensus and non-consensus questions (questions 
with high and low expected consensus with respect to their answer).  
 
Method 
 
In total, 91 participants from a student research pool took part in the study. 
Thirty-one participants made individual judgments of the answerability of 
twenty questions (16 non-consensus and 4 consensus; see Appendix A) while 
thinking aloud and 60 participants made their judgments in pair discussions. 
The questions were answered on the current answerability scale used in Study 
I (Figure 2). Think-aloud protocols and pair discussions were recorded and 
transcribed.  
 
Hypotheses and questions 
 
Two hypotheses and one question were formulated. (1) Both pairs and 
individuals were expected to give higher answerability judgments of the 
consensus questions than for the non-consensus questions. (2) Pairs, 
compared to the individuals, were expected to rate consensus questions more 
answerable and non-consensus questions less answerable. In addition, an 
exploratory question was posed: Is the number of words spoken related to 
perceived answerability?  
 
 
Results 
 
The three hypotheses were confirmed or partly confirmed. Consensus 
questions were rated higher on answerability than non-consensus questions 
by both pairs and individuals; pairs gave higher answerability ratings for 
consensus questions and lower ratings for non-consensus questions than 
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individuals; and on the explorative question, no significant correlation was 
found between the number of words spoken and the answerability judgments. 
However, the pairs who spent more words on consensus questions also rated 
them comparatively lower on answerability. When comparing the relative 
number of words for the consensus questions and the non-consensus 
questions both pairs and individuals spent much more words on the non-
consensus questions. This discrepancy was more evident for the pairs. The 
difference between individuals and pairs with respect to relative number of 
words spent on each question category was statistically significant.  
 
Study III 
 
Purpose 
 
The purpose of Study III was to investigate the difference between beliefs 
that “I know”, “someone else knows” or “no one knows” in relation to 
different question types (consensus and non-consensus), recent knowledge 
activation and individual differences in certainty beliefs, need for cognition 
and maximisation tendencies.  
 
Method 
 
In total, 123 participants from a student research pool took part in the study. 
They judged the answerability of 26 non-consensus and 20 consensus 
questions (see Appendix A). When judging answerability, participants could 
choose between ‘I know’, ‘someone else knows’, or ‘no one knows’. The 
judgments were performed individually on a written questionnaire.  
Half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge about the 
question before making each answerability judgment. An example of a 
knowledge rating is How much relevant knowledge do you have to answer 
the question ‘Where is the main office of NASDAQ?’. Participants rated their 
knowledge on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (“I have no relevant 
knowledge”) to 100 (“I have all relevant knowledge”), with 10-points 
increments (10, 20, 30, etc.).  After making the knowledge rating participants 
in the knowledge rating condition judged the question on answerability, for 
the corresponding question: Where is the main office of NASDAQ situated? 
(‘I know’, ‘someone else knows’, or ‘nobody knows’). Participants in the 
control condition only made answerability judgments. Last, self-report 
measures of need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1984), maximisation 
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tendencies (Diab, Gillespie, & Highhouse, 2008) and belief in certainty of 
knowledge (see Appendix A) were rated.  
 
Hypotheses and questions 
 
Five hypotheses were formulated. The first (1) concerned the experimental 
condition (knowledge rating before answerability judgment or control); the 
second (2), the type of question (consensus or non-consensus), and the others 
concerned individual differences in (3) beliefs in certainty of knowledge, (4) 
maximising tendencies, and (5) the need for cognition. (These hypotheses are 
more fully explained below.) 
 
Results 
 
Most of hypotheses (1, 2, 4 and 5) were partly confirmed one (3) was 
completely confirmed.  
Hypothesis 1 regarding knowledge rating condition was partly confirmed. 
Participants in the knowledge rating condition had a smaller proportion of ‘no 
one knows’, but no interaction between condition and question type was 
found.  
Hypothesis 2 concerning type of question was confirmed in its main 
assumption. The likelihood of answering ‘no one knows’ was higher for the 
non-consensus questions than the consensus question, showing a main effect 
for question type. However, our additional assumption that there were no 
compelling reasons to find a difference in the likelihood between choosing ‘I 
know’ and ‘someone else knows’ for the different question types was not 
supported since the likelihood of choosing ‘someone else knows’ was higher 
than choosing ‘I know’ for non-consensus question compared to the 
consensus questions,  
Hypothesis (3) concerning certainty in knowledge was confirmed, since 
people with higher certainty beliefs were less likely to say, ‘no one knows’. 
Also, as predicted, an interaction effect between certainty of knowledge and 
question type was found. The likelihood of answering “someone else knows” 
was higher compared to “I know” and “no one knows” for participants with 
high belief in certainty of knowledge when answering non-consensus 
questions.  
Hypothesis (4) The fourth hypothesis stated that people high in 
maximisation would choose “Someone else knows” more often than the two 
other options for the non-consensus questions. This hypothesis was 
confirmed since the analysis did show an interaction effect between 
maximisation and question type, the log odds of choosing “someone else 
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knows” were higher for people high in maximisation when answering non-
consensus questions.  
Hypothesis (5) concerning need for cognition was partly confirmed. No 
interaction effect was found between question type and need for cognition as 
we expected. However, we found a main effect of need for cognition in the 
way that people high in need for cognition were less likely to believe 
“someone else knows” compared to “I know” or “no one knows” for both 
non-consensus and consensus questions.   
 
 
Study IV 
 
Purpose 
 
The main purpose of this study was to investigate whether laypersons 
believed that the question about the correct colour of The Dress (Figure 1) 
was answerable. An additional purpose was to investigate the effect of 
previous experience and personal optimism on this answerability judgment. 
The question about the correct answer to The Dress’ colours, could be 
regarded as a non-consensus question, since people disagreed about what 
they saw and believed was correct and was therefore interesting from an 
answerability point of view. 
 
Method 
 
A total of 190 people from a participant pool at University of Gothenburg, 
answered a web survey. While viewing The Dress photograph, they were 
asked whether they had seen the photograph before, and what colours they 
perceived (‘blue and black’; ‘white and gold’; ‘others, namely…’). Then 
there was a page break and participants were asked what they believed was 
the correct colours of The Dress (‘blue and black’; ‘white and gold’; ‘others, 
namely…’; or ‘there is no correct answer’). It was not possible to go back to 
previous pages.  
 
 
Hypotheses and questions 
 
Two hypotheses were formulated: 
(1) Participants who had seen The Dress before would be less likely to 
choose ‘there is no correct answer’. 
 30 
 
(2) Optimists would be more likely than others to believe ‘there is no 
correct answer’ to the question about The Dress colour, in line with 
Study I.  
 
 
Results 
 
The two hypotheses were confirmed. Participants who had seen The Dress 
before chose ‘there is no correct answer’ less often than those who had not. 
Participants who scored higher on optimism chose ‘there is no correct 
answer’ more often than those who scored lower. 
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General discussion  
 
 
This thesis investigated answerability judgments, that is, the judgment if 
anyone can provide a correct answer to a specific question. The results 
suggest that a person’s belief about answerability of a specific question can 
be affected by socially prevalent knowledge and the social and individual 
memory context where the question is presented. When consensus about 
answerability is low, several individual differences (e.g., certainty beliefs, 
optimism and need for cognition) were related to answerability judgments. 
When applying answerability judgments of general knowledge questions to 
an ambiguous colour judgment, it was noticed that some people do think 
there is a correct answer about colours, and some people not believe in the 
colours they perceive.  
First I will discuss why some questions were perceived to be more 
answerable than others. Second, I will describe the findings about question 
answerability judgments regarding social influence, including when 
discussing with others compared to performing the judgments individually. 
Third, the findings regarding individual differences in relation to question 
answerability will be dealt with. Fourth, the possible impact of recent 
knowledge activation will be discussed. Finally, theoretical implications, 
practical implications and limitations are discussed and suggestions for future 
research are provided. 
 
Are some types of questions more answerable 
than others?  
 
One of the research questions of this thesis was Are some types of 
questions perceived to be more answerable than others? In Studies I, II, and 
III questions with high expected consensus about the answerability 
(consensus questions) were compared to questions with low expected 
consensus (non-consensus questions). In Study I, a question category called 
illusion questions was also included. Illusion questions may have appeared 
answerable, but lacked the necessary information to allow a precise and 
interesting answer. Consensus questions were perceived most answerable, 
illusion questions second most answerable, and non-consensus questions the 
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least answerable. This was in line with expectations. Furthermore, in Study 
IV, we included a question regarding a visual judgment.  
 
Consensus questions  
 
The participants rated consensus questions more answerable today (Study I 
and Study II) and in the future (Study I). This result fits expectations about 
effects of (perceived) consensus, including Koriat’s self-consistency model 
(2012) where people are more confident in answers with an expected 
collective agreement. Since consensus opinions are more likely to be 
repeated, it is also in line with a general truth effect (Dechêne et al., 2010) 
that repeated statements are considered as more likely to be true. In addition, 
the result from the future answerability scale variant showed that many 
participants thought they knew the answer themselves to the consensus 
questions which may also increase confidence that the question is 
answerable. 
 
Illusion questions  
 
The illusion questions were rated second most answerable in Study I. Many 
respondents thought somebody else would be able to answer the question 
today, suggesting a “feeling of others knowing” was created. Since it is 
unlikely somebody could come up with an answer to these questions, the 
results indicated that these questions created an illusion of others knowing. 
The standard deviation of the illusion questions was large, indicating that 
other factors than consensus may also be relevant for answerability 
judgments like different kinds of processing (more surficial or more 
deliberate processing) or individual differences. Individual differences will be 
discussed below. Participants that regarded the illusion questions as 
answerable on the future answerability scale also preferred epistemic default 
processing as measured by Epi-r (Elphinstone et al., 2014).  This could 
indicate that the illusion of answerability may have been created because 
people processed the illusion questions on a shallower level, for example 
based on preconceptions, possibly derived from school, that computational 
questions in that domain are answerable (Stahl & Bromme, 2007).  
 
Non-consensus questions  
 
The non-consensus questions were perceived to be the least answerable type 
of questions today (Study I, and II) and in the future (Study I). The standard 
deviation of the non-consensus questions was large and this indicated that 
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other factors than consensus, e.g., individual differences and different kinds 
of processing may also play an important role when judging their 
answerability. This is also in line with Mohammed and Schwall’s (2009) 
general finding that individual differences matter more for judgment and 
decision making under uncertain conditions. Such factors are further 
discussed below.  
 
 
Social influence 
 
Socially prevalent knowledge 
 
The results from the Study I, II and III, indicate that beliefs about socially 
prevalent knowledge is important for answerability judgments. Questions that 
were judged to have higher consensus about answerability was judged to be 
more answerable. These results suggest that people agree with other persons’ 
judgments of answerability, when judging answerability of questions. I have 
earlier referred to this as the effect of consensus or socially prevalent 
knowledge.  
Within research on social influence, compliance is used to denote the 
response to a specific request, for example providing an answer to a question. 
Conformity is used when describing people’s attempts to match their 
behaviour to that of others, for instance changing your own opinion when 
learning about other people’s opinions (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Deutsch 
and Gerard (1955) further distinguished between two types of conformity 
responses; normative conformity is when people follow others to gain social 
approval, while informational conformity is when people use other people’s 
behaviour as guidelines to seek information about reality. Regarding question 
answerability people can of course answer in line with the majority with the 
goal of gaining social approval, but also because they believe that the 
majority may be correct. People may believe that socially prevalent 
knowledge is likely to be correct for at least three reasons: 
First, according to the wisdom of the crowd phenomenon the central 
opinion may often be the correct answer (e.g, Surowiecki, 2004) even though 
there are exceptions where social influence can undermine the wisdom of the 
crowd phenomenon (Lorenz et al., 2010). Second, the consensus opinion is 
likely to be repeated and what is repeated is often believed to be truer (e.g., 
Dechêne et al., 2010) and to be judged as truer. Thirdly, socially prevalent 
knowledge may also increase the likelihood that there is a short experienced 
psychological distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010) to a person claiming to 
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know an answer to a person claiming that the question is answerable, and 
possibly also providing an answer. If there is a wide-spread consensus that 
the question is answerable, and possibly also what the correct answer is, it is 
likely that a person will know someone within close psychological distance 
who would claim the question is answerable.  
 
 
Discussing with others 
 
The presences of another person when deliberating about answerability of 
questions seem to interfere with the result. The results in Study II showed 
that pairs rated the consensus questions more answerable, and the non-
consensus questions less answerable, than individuals. This result was in line 
with a consensus effect and a polarisation effect. Thus, it seems like 
consensus arguments may have been more salient for pairs’ judgments of 
answerability than for individuals’. The difference in consensus dependence 
between individuals and pairs has similarities with research on conformity 
such as Asch’s (1956) findings where participants agreed with consensus 
about the length of a line when in the group, but often answered differently 
when interviewed individually afterwards. People may conform to others for 
various reasons, such as a belief that others often know more than oneself 
about reality, or because they want to avoid social disapproval from other 
people present. Moreover, sometimes people conform to the norm of a group 
they identify with, regardless if other people from the group are present 
(Hogg & Vaughan, 2014).  
The consensus effect may be increased in pairs since pairs can take into 
consideration both present consensus (among pair members) and referred 
consensus (beliefs about consensus of groups not present). If all consensuses 
coincide, the belief that the question is answerable might be amplified. 
However, if the different forms of consensus are in conflict the opposite may 
occur. It is also possible that the pair condition had a more deliberate 
processing since assumptions taken for granted may be questioned or 
sensitised when discussing with others (the pair member). This could have 
resulted in a “deeper” processing of possible complexities and uncertainties, 
which may have made participants realise that it is difficult to judge if the 
question considered can be answered and thus to have contributed to lower 
answerability judgments. More deliberate processing can also be elicited as a 
consequence of special types of accountability. Sometimes when discussing 
answerability, participants strongly defended their own standpoints and 
generated critical reasons and arguments why they were right and the other 
person was wrong (Study II). This could be explained in terms of post-
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decisional accountability, that is, that the individual was trying to defend 
his/her own previous judgment (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). When discussing 
non-consensus questions, compared to consensus questions, it is also more 
likely that the pair members did not on beforehand know other person’s view 
(Study II). When, decision-makers knows in advance that they will be 
accountable to an audience with unknown views who is interested in 
accuracy they are more likely to use self-critical and effortful thinking 
(Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
  
Recent knowledge activation  
 
According to Stewart, Chater, and Brown (2006), and other researchers, 
people’s judgments are often constructive and affected by sample items from 
both the immediate context and the person’s memory. The results from Study 
III suggest that participants who rated their own knowledge before 
performing answerability judgments had a smaller proportion of ‘No one 
knows’.  
By activating memory representations in the knowledge area when doing 
knowledge ratings, participants may have been more aware of the possibility 
that the question answerability rated can be answered (Reder, 1987; Reder & 
Ritter, 1992). Speculatively, the activation of the participants’ knowledge in 
memory created by the knowledge ratings may have created a feeling of 
familiarity that influenced the participants when they made their 
answerability judgments. 
A combination of more “somebody else knows” and “I know” would lead 
to a decrease in “nobody knows”. Below I speculate about reasons how 
knowledge ratings could increase “somebody knows” and “I know”.  
According to Chen and He (2017) contrast effects can be found in 
judgment and decision making, when judging temporal distance and 
probability. Participants who memorised long-term and low-probability 
events treated certain delays as more proximal than those memorising short-
term and high-probability events. It is possible that the effect of knowledge 
ratings could referred to a contrast effect, where other people’s knowledge 
seems better than one’s own knowledge on the topic. Consequently, they 
would more often choose ‘somebody else knows’.  
The knowledge ratings could also have activated memory cues that helped 
the participants to recall answers they believed were true, which led them to 
choose ‘I know’. For example, they may have mentally reinstated the 
physical and psychological environment of the original events when they 
learned the answer to the question. This technique is shown to be memory 
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enhancing technique (see Williams & Holland, 1981) and is for example used 
in the so-called cognitive interview when interviewing eyewitnesses (Fisher 
Geiselman, Raymond, Jurkevich & Warhaftig, 1987).  
 
Individual differences in judging answerability 
 
Individual differences turned out to be related to the level of the 
answerability judgments. Individual differences were as suggested by 
Mohammed and Schwall (2009) more important when the questions were 
surrounded by uncertainty. 
      
 
Epistemic measures  
 
Three of the epistemic measures (i.e., mankind’s efficacy, mankind’s 
knowledge and certainty beliefs) were correlated with each other in Study I. 
These measures were also correlated with lower numbers of “can never be 
answered” responses, suggesting the view that for many questions knowledge 
is experienced to be just a matter of time and not beyond reach of human 
capacity. Thus, there may be some support for individual variation in the 
disposition to think that humans, in general, can gain knowledge (henceforth 
called the ’human knowledge disposition’). By a human knowledge 
disposition, I mean that people often believe that answers exist to non-
consensus as well as consensus questions. 
This tendency, if it has some stability, may be important when facing new 
challenges. For example, a construction project leader needs to judge quickly 
which challenging questions are answerable, and how quickly, to adhere to 
the set budget. Project leaders with a strong human knowledge disposition 
will be more likely to consult experts since they assume an answer, even if 
yet unfound, is known to someone.  
 
Maximisation tendencies 
 
In Study III, the fourth hypothesis stated that people high in maximisation 
would choose “Someone else knows” more often than the two other options 
for the non-consensus questions. This hypothesis was confirmed since the 
analysis did show an interaction effect between maximisation and question 
type.  
In Study III, higher maximisation tendencies was associated with the 
belief that someone else could answer the question. Maximisers may think 
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that an optimal solution exists to their decision problem (Schwartz et al., 
2002), but may have an avoidant, dependent decision-making style (Parker, 
Bruine de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007). Choosing ‘someone else knows’ could 
be considered a way to avoid taking a personal standpoint.  The results from 
Study III, were in line with these expectations.  
 
Need for cognition 
 
The hypothesis in Study III, concerning need for cognition, was partly 
confirmed. No interaction effect was found between question type and need 
for cognition as was expected. However, a main effect of need for cognition 
was found. People high in need for cognition were less likely to believe 
“Somebody else knows” compared to “I know” or “Nobody knows” for both 
non-consensus and consensus questions.   
This result may indicate that when people high in need for cognition find 
the question difficult to answer by themselves they seem to be more willing 
to choose the answer option “no one knows” than “someone else knows”. 
Since people high in need for cognition enjoy abstract and complex thinking 
(Cacioppo et al., 1984), they may be more tolerant of complex phenomena 
and therefore more willing to accept that questions may exist that no one 
today knows the answer to. 
Furthermore, people high in need for cognition have also been found to be 
harder to persuade with new conflicting information when they have already 
formed a personal opinion (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992). Therefore, they may 
be more likely to choose that they know themselves rather than others know 
in case their own opinion differ with the opinion of others. However, when 
having less extreme previous beliefs, people high in need for cognition have 
been shown to be more likely to provide an inconclusive answer to a 
controversial question (Kardash  & Scholes, 1996), an alternative that 
reminds of our choice “nobody can answer”. People high in need for 
cognition are also more inclined to be neutral to an ambiguous topic if faced 
with two-sided arguments than other people (Winter, Krämer, Rösner & 
Neubaum, 2014).  
 
 
Optimism 
 
Interestingly, optimists used the alternative ‘cannot be answered today’ more 
frequently than others in Study I and ‘no correct answer’ more often in Study 
IV. Thus, optimists were more prone to believe that questions did not have 
answers today, suggesting that personal optimism may be a counterbalance to 
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the suggested human knowledge disposition. Optimists also judged the 
illusion questions more often by assessing them as significantly less 
answerable. The result for optimism in Study IV replicated the result from 
Study I, that higher optimism was related to the belief that the question could 
not be answered today. In this study, participants were not instructed about 
any theoretical view on answerability; instead, we used more natural 
wordings to ask about beliefs about The Dress colours. Still the relation 
between optimism and answerability was replicated, which suggests some 
ecological validity of the relation between answerability and optimism, at 
least for a Swedish sample.  
This may be due to optimists’ tendency to try harder than less optimistic 
people (e.g., Carver et al., 2009). Optimism is also related to self-efficacy 
(Karademas, 2006; Luszczynska, Gutierrez-Dona, & Schwarzer, 2005). High 
optimism and self-efficacy may help optimists to accept that questions are not 
answerable, for example since they are more prone to believe that something 
good will happen for themselves even if the circumstances are uncertain 
(Monzani et al., 2014).  
However, trait optimism measured with Lot-r may also bias judgments 
surrounded with uncertainty (Sharot, Christoph, & Dolan, 2011) such as 
answerability judgments. Baumeister (1989) argued that optimism is adaptive 
only within limits, and that beyond an “optimal margin of illusion” there may 
be a “reluctance to admit mistakes or misdeeds”.  Furthermore, optimism 
self-rating scales such as the Lot-r that was used in this thesis are also related 
to healthier aspects of narcissism (Hickman, Watson & Morris, 1996).  In line 
with these research findings, believing “there is no correct answer” could be a 
way to defend the own personal opinion in case it conflicts with the scientific 
opinion. People scoring high on narcissism tend to self-enhance by claiming 
knowledge that they do not in fact have (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 
2002). People scoring high on personal optimism (and aspects of narcissism 
correlated with optimism) may be extra optimistic about their own viewpoint 
when in conflict with the viewpoint of the majority.  
 
Previous experience and previous beliefs 
 
Previous experience is associated with more familiarity, and an initial 
feeling of knowing the answer, since the question terms are recognised 
(Reder & Ritter, 1992). In the data-set of Study IV previous experience of the 
photograph was associated with less frequent use of “there is no correct 
answer”.  This result could for example be due to that participants with 
previous exposure get a “feeling of knowing the answer” (Reder & Ritter, 
1992). However, the sample of participants who had seen The Dress before 
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was small (N = 33) and these result could also reflect random variations. 
There are also reasons to believe that increased experience may lead to the 
belief that “there is no correct answer”.  
Previous experience of a question may sometimes also be difficult to 
separate from social influence. People with previous experience of a question 
are more likely to have memories of other people’s beliefs about an answer, 
which in turn could affect answerability judgments. However, not all social 
information may influence answerability judgments, since people search for, 
believe and remember information from others selectively (Kahan et al., 
2011; Mazzoni, Delaney, Nghiem, & Waldum, 2009; Nickerson & Raymond, 
1998). In general, people search for belief confirming evidence and are 
therefore more likely to believe information from others that is in line with 
their previous beliefs (Munro, 2010; Nickerson & Raymond, 1998).  
In general, people are also more likely to incorporate and believe 
information perceived as good news for themselves (Sharot et al., 2011; 
Sharot et al., 2012; Sharot & Garett, 2016). For people scoring high on 
optimism, this bias in information updating is even more significant (Sharot, 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, people are more likely to believe information and 
from people that they have something in common with or trust (Kahan et al., 
2012, Van Cappellen, Cornelle, Cols & Saroglou, 2011). Moreover, social 
influence on ambiguous topics is likely to be more efficient when introduced 
early in a decision-making process when no firm personal belief has formed 
(Loftus, 1977; Martin, 1997).  
Thus, previous personal beliefs, can be both a hindrance and a facilitator 
for accepting newly learned scientific results, and therefore hinder for 
acceptance of a new answer option (e.g., that a question goes from not 
possible to answer today, to the opinion that there is a solution). 
 If people do not want to deny new facts completely, they can instead 
dismiss the whole question as being impossible to answer within science. 
Munro (2010) found for example that when the own personal belief about an 
answer was in contrast to the scientific answer, people may argue that the 
question is not possible to answer within science. This phenomenon is called 
the scientific impotence excuse (Munro, 2010), and can be considered a 
special form of the popular term “fact resistance”.   
Elby and Hammer (2000) described how (Western) philosophers and 
researchers in epistemology have developed a consensus that a sophisticated 
knowledge view includes the belief that knowledge is considered tentative 
and evolving rather than certain and unchanging. Since it may sound more 
desirable to be considered sophisticated than the opposite, the Western 
schooling system may communicate these values to a larger extent than for 
example the Asian (Li, Chen, & Yu, 2006). The drawback would be the just 
 40 
 
described form of the phenomenon of fact resistance, by referring to 
knowledge as uncertain when it conflicts when the own opinion. Even though 
evidence is compelling, it may sometimes be socially acceptable to use the 
“scientific impotence excuse”, at least in Western cultures.  
 
Theoretical implications of the findings 
 
Under this heading I will discuss how the answerability construct was 
measured, and conclusions of theoretical interest that may be implied from 
the results from these studies.  
 
 
Measuring answerability judgments 
 
Answerability as defined above is a facetted construct. It concerns judgments 
about one’s own knowledge, other people’s knowledge, and the limits of 
human knowledge. In this thesis, I used different scale variants to tap into 
answerability.  
In Studies I, II, and III instructions and examples of what was meant 
by answerability were shown to participants before they answered the 
questions. The advantage of providing instructions is that it ensures that the 
participants understand the questions as intended by the researchers. 
However, this may decrease the studies’ external validity. Do people actually 
receive and use such instructions in daily life? In Study IV, no instructions 
were provided to guide answerability judgments, but ‘There is no correct 
answer’ was offered as a possible response. Some people did choose that 
response, suggesting that they concluded a question could not be answered 
correctly by anyone. Interestingly, the same relation between optimism and 
answerability (higher optimism, lower answerability) was found in both 
Study I and Study IV, which suggests that the relation between answerability 
and optimism maybe constant, regardless of whether answerability is 
measured with or without instructions about the construct. However, merely 
providing the alternative ‘There is no correct answer’ might also influence 
how people reason about the question, in that it my induce critical thinking 
about the question itself. 
Answerability was graded on a scale in Studies I and II, but Studies III 
and IV use dichotomous alternatives. An advantage of graded scales is the 
more detailed statistics that can be computed. The disadvantage may be that 
this may not the mental model that most people naturally have. At least some 
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people may prefer to sort questions into mutually exclusive categories: 
‘answerable’ or ‘not answerable’. The relations between optimism and 
answerability and between certainty beliefs and answerability were replicated 
when answerability was measured on a graded scale (Study I) and with 
dichotomous alternatives (Studies III and IV). Consensus questions were also 
rated more answerable than non-consensus questions on both a graded scale 
(Study I and II) and with dichotomous options (Study III). Thus, the results of 
the studies in this thesis suggest that the construct measured with the graded 
scales is related to the construct measured with the option scales. Taken 
together these results suggest that measures of answerability are stable in 
relation to each other. 
‘Answerability today’, whether respondents thought anyone could 
currently answer the question, was measured in all four studies. In Study I, 
answerability in the future (beliefs about when someone would be able to 
answer the question) was also measured. These measures were correlated, in 
that questions considered less answerable today were also considered to be 
answerable further off in the future. In Studies III and IV, I focused on who 
could answer questions considered possible to answer. For the type of 
questions considered most answerable in Study I, the most common answer 
in Study III was that participants knew the answer themselves. Thus, there is 
both a connection between future and current answerability and a connection 
between high answerability and knowing the answer oneself. These results 
may suggest that answerability judgments can include an evaluation of the 
distance from the self to the correct answer in time and space. I discuss this 
further below.  
  
 
 
Answerability judgments and psychological distance  
 
Trope and Liberman (2010) suggested that temporal distance, social 
distance, and spatial distance have a common denominator in psychological 
distance. In this section, I offer some proposals on answerability judgments 
and their relation to judgments about the psychological distance to the 
answer.  
Greater psychological distance is associated with ‘higher level 
construals’. Higher level construals can be considered as relatively abstract, 
coherent, and superordinate mental representations compared with lower-
level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2010, p. 441). Consider the question, 
‘What is the name of our galaxy?’ The answer ‘Milky Way’ may represent a 
lower construal level than ‘Astronomers can answer that kind of question’. A 
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known answer provided by the person questioned is likely to be more 
concrete compared to an unknown answer (e.g., ‘I think an astronomer 
knows’) that may be provided by someone else. When people know an 
answer, they can describe it in detail because they are aware of the relevant 
details; it is more difficult for people to describe in detail something 
unknown to them. A person who has an idea, but not certain knowledge, may 
answer more vaguely. For example, on the question ‘Who wrote the books 
Kris and Kallokain?’, the answer might be ‘I think it was a Swedish writer’. 
The answerability of questions that people can answer on a personal low 
level of construal may therefore be rated high on answerability by that 
person, whether or not their answer is correct. 
The results of Studies I and III suggest that judgments about answerability 
on consensus questions may be associated with short temporal and social 
distance to the answers. In addition to beliefs about consensus, the consensus 
questions that were considered high in answerability in Studies I and III had 
in common the fact that people were more likely to think that they could 
provide correct answers to the questions themselves.  
In Study III, proportionally more participants (58%) stated that they knew 
the answers to the consensus questions than the only 27% who claimed to 
know the answers to the non-consensus questions. Similarly, in Study I, more 
people thought they knew the answer to the consensus questions than to the 
non-consensus questions. For the consensus questions the typical answer was 
‘Can be answered by me, and maybe someone else’ on the future scale. Thus, 
the social distance to the answer could be considered short for consensus 
questions rated high in answerability (‘I know’ is a shorter social distance 
than ‘someone else knows’). The results of Study I also showed that 
questions considered more answerable by someone today were also judged to 
be answerable sooner in the future. Thus, the temporal distance to the answer 
was judged to be short for questions high in answerability today. 
The reference point in construal level theory is egocentric: ‘It is the self in 
the here and now’ (Trope and Liberman, 2010, p. 440). When judging 
whether someone else could answer the question, the point of reference is 
another person’s perspective. Interestingly, the percentage believing that 
someone else could answer the question was quite evenly distributed over 
questions in Study III (41.7% for the consensus and 42.4%. for the non-
consensus questions). The equal numbers may reflect the difficulty of judging 
what someone else might know about any question one cannot answer 
oneself (compare Kruger and Dunning, 1999).  
People who are unaware of a low-level construal answer and have 
difficulty judging their own or someone else’s psychological distance from a 
correct answer may use heuristics. I speculate below on two such heuristics: 
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psychological distance to the question and psychological distance to a person 
providing a low construal level answer.  
For the illusion questions, the typical answer in Study I was that ‘someone 
else’ could provide an answer, and these questions were rated quite high in 
answerability on the current answerability scale. However, for the consensus 
questions, the typical answer was ‘I know the answer myself’ (Studies I and 
III). One explanation may be that people increase their psychological distance 
from the question when they estimate its answerability. Instead of processing 
the question item per se, (e.g., the illusion question ‘What is the area of an 
ellipse with a minor axis of 2 cm?’ ‘Is it 4? or 6? What formula should I use 
to calculate the area?’) the person may judge answerability based on high 
construal-level domain-specific beliefs about certainty of knowledge such as 
‘Physics questions are answerable’ (Stahl and Bromme, 2007). A person with 
the pre-conception that computational physics questions are answerable when 
asked a question that by its terms and wording signal its belonging in that 
domain (compare Reder & Ritter, 1992), may considere that question high in 
answerability without processing the question on a low construal level and 
computing the answer.  
People may use their psychological distance to a person providing an 
answer as an approximation for the psychological distance to the correct 
answer. A dear friend is likely to be represented in memory on a lower 
construal level than an unknown, faraway expert, heard of long ago. 
Considerable research suggests that people within a short psychological 
distance are more believable (Johansson & Allwood, 2007; Kahan et al., 
2011, Ranu, Dhillon & Kelly, 2015). Other research suggests that people are 
more likely to believe the opinions of people who share their political, 
religious, or other values (Kahan et al., 2011; Ranu et al., 2015). Johansson 
and Allwood (2007) also found that people may rely heavily on a friend’s 
opinion (from whom they have short psychological distance as defined by 
Trope and Liberman, 2010) when they do not know themselves.  
 
Answerability judgments as estimations of a vector 
 
A vector is a quantity that has both direction and magnitude. I propose 
that answerability judgments may sometimes include estimations of a vector 
in which the starting point is the self and the magnitude is the judgment of the 
psychological distance (as defined by Trope and Liberman 2010) to the 
correct answer. The idea that judgments can be described by both direction 
and magnitude is not new. Busemeyer and Bruza (2012) described judgments 
in terms of vectors and Yates (2003) described a decision as a course of 
action, which implies direction.  
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When the psychological distance to the correct answer is considered short 
and the direction to the answer is considered clear, it may be likely that the 
question is considered answerable. If the direction to the answer is unclear, 
for instance if two or more competing answers are mutually exclusive (e.g., if 
the psychological distance to ‘no’ may be judged as far as to ‘yes’) the person 
may be indecisive (Yates et al., 2010) and answerability may be considered 
low. 
If the above reasoning is correct, reducing uncertainty in the direction of 
the answerability vector and shortening the judgment of psychological 
distance to a specific answer would increase the likelihood of a person’s 
believing the question is answerable.  
 
Non-believed perceptions 
 
Estimations of psychological distance and direction to the answer do not 
seem to be enough to explain answerability judgments. The application of 
answerability research to colour judgments (in Study IV) revealed a 
phenomenon denoted ‘non-believed perceptions’. In Study IV some people 
who perceivied a coloured detail in a photograph as white and gold believed 
that ‘blue and black’ was the correct answer to this ambiguous colour 
judgment. This finding may be puzzling if answerability judgments are only a 
judgment of the direction and psychological distance to the answer. 
Intuitively, one’s own perceptual experience is likely to have a short temporal 
and social psychological distance to one-self. Inconsistencies in applying 
construal level theory to other judgments on ambigious findings have been 
reported (e.g., Gong & Medin, 2012), and may be due to the difficulty of 
applying construal level theory, despite how theoretically interesting it may 
be. 
If a person has a low construal level recollection of another person’s 
memory, the psychological distance to that person’s memory may also be 
perceived as very short – perhaps even as short as to their own personal 
experience. In memory research, it has been suggested that people can have 
vivid vicarious recollections of other people’s experiences and memories 
(Pillemer, Steiner, Kuwabara Kirkegaard Thomsen & Svob, 2015). It has also 
been found that when people lack autobiographical recollections of their own, 
their reconstructed memories (e.g., a childhood event recounted by a parent) 
can be considered very plausible. People can also have vivid recollections of 
visual details of ‘non-believed memories’ (e.g., childhood memories that they 
have been told never happened; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; 
Scoboria & Pascal, 2016).  
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Answerability judgments as a metacognitive reality check  
 
Blank (2016) suggested that non-believed memories are a consequence of a 
healthy metacognitive reality check that draws on general world knowledge 
and social or other external information. The findings in Study IV that some 
people have non-believed perceptions may also be explained by such reality 
checks.  
Some people chose to report non-believed perceptions in Study IV, and 
some reported that the question was not answerable. This suggests that 
answerability judgments may include judgments about the psychological 
distance to the correct answer as well as a metacognitive reality check 
(Blank, 2016) or strategy selection (Reder, 1987). Thus, even if answerability 
judgments include judgments about the psychological distance to the answer, 
the results of Study IV suggest that people may also conduct a reality check 
on their distance to the judgment.  
More research is needed to explain the findings about non-believed 
perceptions. Such research may also better explain answerability judgments. 
Is it possible that the psychological distance to another person’s memory is 
judged to be shorter, in line with the theory of Pillemer et al. (2016), than the 
distance to one’s own perceptual experience? This question also raises deep 
questions about the location of the self and metacognitive judgments. 
 
 
Practical implications of the findings 
 
The purpose of this section is mainly to illustrate how results about question 
answerability research may be applied in a wider context.  
In this thesis, I suggest that consensus effects are important in judging 
question answerability. In the next section, I will discuss the consequences of 
consensus effects on answerability for new ideas that require that we not 
think like others. Study II compared individuals’ and pairs’ judgments of 
answerability and I will discuss whether one brain is better than two for 
judging question answerability.  
In the two sections following the consensus effect, I will discuss 
deliberately induced misjudgments of answerability (illusions of 
answerability), beginning with the creation of questions that seem 
unanswerable and leading to a discussion on whether it is possible to create 
an illusion of answerability. Finally, I will address some general implications 
for decision-makers. 
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The consensus effect on answerability and innovation 
 
An innovation can, at least sometimes, provide an answer to a question 
people previously considered impossible to answer in the short term. 
However, the ‘consensus effect’, people’s reliance on others’ judgments 
about answerability, is likely to lead to conservatism and discourage 
innovation. Therefore, in line with Actor Network Theory (ANT; Allwood & 
Eriksson, 2010), an innovator needs to create a consensus within the target 
group that the innovation is a good answer to an important question, thus 
confirming the question’s answerability.  
 
Are two brains better than one when judging question 
answerability?  
 
When judging question answerability in daily life, is it better to make 
judgments individually or in groups? The results of Study II suggest that 
different question types elicited different processes, but which is best may 
depend on the context. The consensus effect was important in the pair 
discussions, and non-consensus questions may be rated less answerable by 
pairs than by individuals. It seemed more time-consuming to address non-
consensual questions in pairs if the partners were striving for consensus. It 
should be noted that the pairs were instructed to try to agree on the ratings 
before making a written judgment. Although it may be likely, it should not be 
taken for granted that pairs always strive for consensus in daily life. For 
example, in a work situation one pair member may have a superior position 
to the other and therefore think that their view should be decisive. However, 
even when instructed to come to a consensus decision (i.e., in Study II), pairs 
in some cases agreed to disagree or made compromises when they could not 
find a consensus solution about a judgment. This observation indicates the 
ecological validity of the data.  
 
Individual differences 
 
The results in this thesis suggest individual differences are related to question 
answerability judgments. However, these results do not imply causality. Do 
individual differences affect answerability? Is it the other way around? Or is 
it a mutual relationship? The process of judging controversial issues may 
activate and influence a person’s epistemological predispositions. Kienhues, 
Bromme, and Stahl (2008) reported that domain-specific certainty beliefs 
could be changed through a short-term intervention, and it is possible that 
performing answerability judgments may affect certainty beliefs. 
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In the research presented here, people with a stronger belief in the human 
capability of acquiring true and complete knowledge judged questions as 
more answerable. Assuming some stability in such a disposition, even if it is 
changeable over time, it is not unlikely that these people would be more 
inclined to ask and perhaps also to believe in experts for advice, since they 
believe someone ought to know if they do not know themselves.  
If individual differences affect question answerability, one may ask what 
individual properties would be good to possess for making realistic 
judgments of question answerability? This issue is very large and falls 
outside of the scope of this dissertation and should be attended to in future 
research. 
An optimistic person believing in mankind’s efficacy may be more likely 
not to give up and keep on striving for solutions. However, too much of a 
human knowledge disposition and belief in mankind’s efficacy can cause 
problems that are difficult and costly to handle (e.g., deposition of nuclear 
waste).  
 
 
How to create an illusion that a question is not answerable 
 
Is it possible to create an illusion that a question is less answerable than it 
actually is? This study indicated that a question may appear less answerable 
to most people if no consensus is found about the issue in question. 
Therefore, questioning scientific consensus can be a powerful tool to spread 
socially induced ignorance about a question already considered scientifically 
answered. For example, the tobacco industry appears to have wanted the 
question ‘Can smoking cause cancer?’ to be considered unanswerable. By 
spreading conflicting and irrelevant ‘research’ to convince the public there 
was no scientific agreement about smoking causing cancer, it was hoped the 
question would appear less answerable (Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008). An 
employee of the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company, cited in Proctor 
and Schiebinger (2008, p. 1), expressed this strategy in an internal memo 
with the quotation: ‘Doubt is our product’. This story could well repeat itself 
in other contexts.  
 
 
How to create an illusion of answerability 
 
Is it possible to make a question appear more answerable than it actually is, 
thus creating an illusion of answerability? The findings for the illusion 
questions in this thesis indicate that it is possible to create a ‘feeling of others 
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knowing’ even though this may not be the case. Consequently, it may be 
possible for different actors (e.g., media or domain experts) to convince other 
people, not as engaged in the topic, to think the answers to unsolvable 
questions are known, thus creating an illusion of answerability. Exactly how 
a ‘feeling of others knowing’ is created needs further research. Even though 
the illusion questions in this thesis cannot be seen as representative of all 
possible illusion questions, they may serve as an inspiration for further 
research on how to create (or maybe avoid) an illusion of answerability.  
 
Implications for decision-makers 
 
When a person claims that a question is possible to answer, I argue that it is 
important to remember that this is a judgment that can be more or less correct 
in relation to factual states of the world. Questions that are believed to be 
answerable may still be unclear, and sometimes there may be unknown easy 
solutions to difficult problems that we are currently unaware of. Decision-
makers could benefit from being aware that answerability judgments 
sometimes need to be reconsidered. As described above, personal beliefs, 
individual differences in cognitive style, social interactions, and socially 
prevalent opinions can bias answerability judgments with illusions of 
answerability or resistance to compelling evidence.  
 
Limitations 
 
This research is limited in many ways. It is only possible to draw conclusions 
about how the measured variables in this thesis may affect question 
answerability. However, these measures may not include all the possible 
factors that may affect question answerability judgments. For example, I have 
not taken into consideration motives that could influence how people reason 
about information (Kunda, 1990) and which could also affect their judgments 
about question answerability. The questions used as stimuli also limited the 
results. Even though the questions used in this research covered several 
disparate areas, other questions may have provided different results. The 
researchers’ categorisation of questions into consensus and non-consensus 
was supported by the pre-studies, but other categorisations of questions could 
also be salient to their answerability and interfere with the consensus 
classification used here. The number of questions in each category may also 
have affected ratings in different ways even though randomisations were used 
to avoid fatigue and learning effects. Introducing a definition of an 
answerable question to the participants, by specifying what we meant by the 
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question being answered, may have contributed to decreased ecological 
validity since participants might define an answerable question differently in 
daily life.  
The epistemic measures were related to question answerability, but some 
research suggests that certainty beliefs are not necessarily stable due to 
individual differences (Broomell & Bodilly Kane, 2017), and the level of the 
ratings may have been affected by situational factors as well as other 
individual predispositions or sociocultural factors. The effect of the 
individual difference variables was, as is often the case in this type of 
research, quite modest (e.g., Buratti, Allwood & Kleitman, 2013; Dahl, 
Allwood, Rennemark & Hagberg, 2010), which may challenge the practical 
significance of these results on a general level. However, for a particular 
decision, the personal attributes of the individual may be crucial. The causal 
relationship between the investigated types of individual differences and 
question answerability also needs further attention. Do individual differences 
(e.g., certainty beliefs) affect answerability judgments or vice versa? Or is it a 
reciprocal relationship?  
A further limitation is that the sample consisted mainly of Swedish 
students, so the results may not generalise to other samples. For example, 
cultural differences in judgment and decision making have been reported 
between nations (e.g., Yates et al., 1997, 2010). Answerability as such can 
also be perceived as a complicated concept to investigate, and people more 
interested in such issues (students) may have been overrepresented in the 
studies.  
The results of the illusion questions provide some evidence that a ‘feeling 
of others knowing’ can be created. However, even if Study I presents some 
promising ideas about how to create a feeling of others knowing, it neither 
explains nor examines the details of how that illusion can be created. 
  
 
Further research 
 
Given that answerability, in the sense used in this thesis, is a very new area of 
research, many opportunities are open for further study. For example, apart 
from investigating the stability of the results in this thesis, further research 
should explore other types of questions, questions from domains other than 
those explored in this thesis, and more or less understandable questions. Also, 
the effect of familiarity with the questions on their answerability should be 
further investigated.  
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Furthermore, individual differences in beliefs could be further explored, 
preferably in repeated measures designs. Other categories of people should be 
tested to investigate whether the results from the participants in this study can 
be generalised and to investigate the interplay between cultural and 
individual differences. It would also be interesting to compare experts and 
non-experts responses about question answerability. 
Further research could also focus on the effect of individual differences in 
answerability judgments. For example, the causality link between certainty 
beliefs and question answerability needs further attention, as does the causal 
mechanisms related to the relation between optimism and answerability.  
An assumption was made in the thesis that more deliberate thinking may 
be associated with pair discussions of non-consensus questions. However, 
this does not exclude the possibility that some pairs reached a quick 
conclusion on some questions that they reckoned no one could know. As an 
addition to the quick and slow personal ‘don’t know’ judgments investigated 
by Koelers and Palef (1976) and Glucksberg and McCloskey (1981), further 
research could benefit from investigating when and why quick and slow ‘no 
one knows’ judgments are made, both individually and in pairs. 
The illusion questions provide an intriguing area of research with ethical 
undertones. How is it possible to create or prevent a feeling that others know, 
when they do not? The question is important to investigate since it is possible 
to use such strategies to both avoid and to create an answerability illusion. 
However, more research is needed to investigate the mechanisms of the 
‘feeling of others knowing’ and the ‘feelings of others not knowing’. 
Several applied areas would benefit from more research into question 
answerability. For example, in many situations when a person or an 
organisation considers consulting others for help, advice or answers are likely 
to include question answerability judgments as an important decision-making 
step (e.g., witness interrogations and managerial decision making). Since 
social interactions may affect answerability judgments, the decision processes 
of experts and influencial persons need attention. For example, which 
differences in answerability judgments would be found when experts work in 
cross-functional teams, rather than alone, in the context of treating a patient 
or solving a technical problem? One applied area of interest for question 
answerability is in medical decision making. This is particularly relevant 
since features enlightened by research in embodied cognition (Borghi & 
Cimatti, 2010) may affect the answerability judgments for the patient in ways 
different to those for medical experts. For example, question answerability 
about the body is likely to be affected by bodily sensations (e.g., pain) and 
the brain’s representation of the body (Moseley, Gallace & Spence, 2012). 
On the other hand, question answerability about another person’s body may 
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be associated with individual differences related to embodied cognition such 
as empathy (Asai, Zhu, Sugimori & Yoshihiko, 2011).  
Another area where the framework of answerability judgments could be 
applied is climate science. People’s beliefs about climate science have been 
hotly debated and scientifically studied (e.g., Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; 
Kahan et al., 2012) and research on judgments about question answerability 
would contribute to that body of research.  
Finally, this thesis’ unexpected findings about non-believed perceptions of 
colours also inspires further research. These findings suggest further research 
on colour judgments in connection with research on metacognition (e.g., 
Blank, 2016), non-believed memories (e.g., Mazzoni et al. 2010; Scoboria & 
Pascal, 2016), and beliefs about colour constancy (e.g., Brainard et al., 2006). 
Is seeing judging?  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis contributes by describing and investigating a specific type of 
judgments: answerability judgments. Answerability concerns the judgment of 
whether anyone can provide a correct answer to a particular question. Such 
judgments can be important when making individual and social decisions; 
answerability judgments can affect subsequent important judgments and 
decisions (e.g., if a person believes that no one can provide a correct answer 
about global climate change, this person will most likely be less motivated to 
engage in actions against global warming). Basic research on answerability 
judgments can provide insights in applied areas such as managerial and 
medical decision making, climate science, and any area where a person or an 
organisation consults someone else for guidance. An increased understanding 
of answerability judgments can also provide insights into basic psychological 
research into non-believed memories, future intentions, confidence 
judgments, and cognitive processing of ambiguous and incomplete perceptual 
stimuli.  
Judgments of answerability include judgments of both whether a question 
is possible to answer by anyone today (current answerability) or by someone 
in the future (future answerability). Answerability judgments also include 
beliefs about which person, if any, can answer a specific question. Results in 
this thesis showed that questions considered more answerable today were 
also considered more answerable in the near future, and questions where a 
concrete answer could be provided were considered more answerable, 
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suggesting that answerability could include judgments of psychological 
distance from the self to the question.  
The studies in this thesis also suggest that the opinion of relevant others 
may influence a person’s answerability judgments strongly. People generally 
tend to agree with most others in answerability judgments. However, 
individual differences were also related to answerability judgments, 
especially on questions where there was a lack of consensus if the question 
was answerable (non-consensus questions).  
When judging general knowledge questions, higher current answerability 
judgments were associated with more optimistic beliefs about mankind and 
mankind’s knowledge and with maximising tendencies. Participants who 
believed in mankind’s efficacy believed that questions would be answered 
sooner in the future. In contrast, optimistic beliefs about the self were 
associated with low short-term answerability judgments about non-consensus 
questions and illusion questions. People with a high need for cognition were 
less likely to believe that someone else could provide an answer. 
Contextual associations such as recent knowledge activation, through 
reflecting alone or discussing in groups, is likely to influence answerability 
judgments. More stable contextual associations, such as general beliefs about 
the knowledge in a certain knowledge domain may also colour the 
answerability of questions and possibly create an illusion of answerability. 
When applying the answerability framework to judgments about the colours 
in an ambiguous photograph, some people may believe there is no correct 
answer about colours, or that the colours they perceive themselves are 
incorrect. Previous experience of the photograph was associated with the 
question becoming more answerable  
The results of this thesis suggest that a persons’ belief about the 
answerability of a particular question can be affected by social consensus and 
communication strategies. Depending on individual differences in optimism, 
views of knowledge, and other factors, people may arrive at different 
conclusions about answerability and these various factors warrant further 
research.  
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Appendix A 
 
 
Questions used in Studies I, II, and III 
 
The knowledge questions used in Studies I, II, and III are listed by category 
below. Three categories of questions were used: consensus, non-consensus, 
and illusion. Questions marked with an asterisk* were used in Study I. 
Modifications to fit to the future answerability scale in Study I are shown in 
parentheses and marked /xxx/*. Questions in italics were used in Study II. 
Four questions used only in Study II are presented under a separate heading 
(“Non-consensus questions used only in Study II”). Both non-consensus and 
consensus questions were used in Study III. 
Except for the questions used only in Study II, the battery of questions 
was initially developed in Pre-study 1, and validated in Pre-studies 1 and 2 
(pre-studies are briefly reported in Appendix C). In Pre-study 1, questions 
were presented in pairs according to the following 25 domains: Swedish 
grammar, Stock trading, Soccer, Galaxies, Dog breeds, Mechanics, Political 
science, Authors, Programming, Climate science, Politicians, Vitamins, 
Flowers, Space, Cooking, Geometry, Measurement units, Physics, Medicine, 
Databases, South American history, Diseases, Ticks, Summer songs, and 
Technology. Pairs were constructed so that all three categories were 
combined and spread among pairs as much as possible. Respondents were 
asked to judge answerability either on a current answerability scale or a 
future answerability scale; no titles were used.  
 
Consensus questions 
• Which word-class does the word “beautiful” belong to? (Swedish 
grammar)* 
• Where is the main office of NASDAQ located? (Stock trading) 
• What is Zlatan’s surname? (Soccer) 
• What is the name of our galaxy? (Galaxies)* 
• In what country will the World Cup be played in 2014? (Soccer) 
• Which breed is considered the smallest? (Dog breeds) 
• What is the usual nose colour of a German Shepherd? (Dog breeds) 
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• What does m stand for in the formula F = ma? (Mechanics) 
• Which department is responsible for, among others, the police, the 
prosecution, the courts, and the correctional facilities (Political 
science) 
• Who wrote the books Kris and Kallocain? (Authors) 
• In the coding language Pascal, the code begins with the command 
‘Begin’. What does it end with? (Programming) 
• What is the name of the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs? 
(Politicians) 
• How many petals does a blue anemone usually have? (Flowers) 
• Which flower is called Anemone Nemorosa in Latin? (Flowers) 
• What is a super-nova? (Space)* 
• What do you call the mixture of flour and water that you can add to a 
sauce to make it thicker? (Cooking) 
• The formula for the circumference of a circle is denoted π*D. What 
does D stand for? (Geometry)* 
• How many centimetres make one inch (measured to one decimal)? 
(Measurement units) 
• This vitamin is provided in drops to children and can be acquired 
through sunlight. What is the vitamin called? (Vitamins) 
• What is a database called that usually consists of several tables of 
relations? (Databases) 
• Who wrote ‘Sommaren är kort’ [‘Summer is short’]? (Summer 
songs) 
• In ‘Den blomstertid nu kommer, med lust och ...’ [The time of 
flowers is approaching, with pleasure and…’], what are the next two 
words? (Summer songs) 
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• What is the voltage if the electric current is 10 amperes and the 
resistance is 15 kiloohms? (Physics)*  
• The virus that causes chicken pox can also cause another disease. 
Which one? (Diseases)* 
• What is another word for the branch of medicine that deals with the 
uses, effects, and modes of drugs? (Medicine)* 
• In which century did Columbus start the European colonisation of 
South America? (South American history)* 
 
Non-consensus questions 
• How many varieties of the word "snow" did humans have during the 
ice age? (Swedish grammar)* 
• Which stock is the most profitable to buy? (Stock trading) 
• How many galaxies are there in the universe? (Galaxies)* 
• Is there any department that would be more efficient if divided into 
two or more units? (Political science) 
• What proportion of all diseases have psychological causes? 
(Diseases)* 
• What proportion of authors in the world have had major economic 
troubles? (Authors) 
• Which programming language is the best for embedded systems? 
(Programming) 
• Who will be the next prime minister of Sweden? (Politicians) 
• How much vitamin C do you get by eating carrots? (Vitamins) 
• Which method is the best to heat fish? (Cooking) 
• How many species of bacteria can be transmitted to humans through 
ticks? (Ticks)* 
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• How much environmentally hazardous material does the /anno 
2014/* most common laptop contain? (Technology)* 
• Are humans causing the greenhouse effect? (Climate science)* 
• Will the polar ice caps melt in 500 years? /before year 2514/* 
(Climate science)* 
• Is there life in space? (Space)* 
• What kind of database is the best to use if you are running a small 
company? (Databases) 
• Is there /anno 2014/* a safe technology for storing nuclear waste? 
(Technology)* 
• Does the vaccination /used year 2014/* provide safe protection 
against tick-borne encephalitis? (Ticks)* 
• Did the Mayans have any knowledge about the end of the world? 
(South American history)* 
• Does the human body /anno 2014/* have a circulatory system that is 
as yet unknown? (Medicine)* 
 
Non-consensus questions used only in Study II 
• Are congestion charges good for the environment? 
• Can you become allergic to electricity?  
• Can genetically modified fruits and vegetables be dangerous to 
nature’s ecological systems? 
• Is radiation from cell phones dangerous?  
 
Illusion questions 
• What is the kinetic energy (measured in joules) of a vehicle moving 
at 90 km/h? (Mechanics) 
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• What is the area of an ellipse with a minor axis of 2 cm? 
(Geometry)* 
• What is the electric power at a voltage of 100 volt? (Physics)* 
• How many Newtons correspond to 3 kg/s2? (Measurement units)  
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Appendix B 
 
Measures 
 
Belief in certainty of knowledge (Bråten & Strømsø, 2005)3 
• If scientists try hard enough they can find the truth about almost 
everything).4 
• Scientists can ultimately get to the truth. 
• Educators should know by now which is the best method: lectures or 
small group discussions. 
• If professors would stick more to the facts and do less theorising, one 
could get more out of college. 
Mankind’s efficacy 
• Mankind can always manage to solve difficult problems if it tries 
hard enough. 
• Even if hard times threaten mankind, mankind will find ways to 
reach its goals. 
                                                                
3 The selected questions for beliefs about certainty of knowledge were intended to tap the 
participants’ attitudes towards the possibility that any human could have certain knowledge. 
The choice of suitable items for measuring beliefs in certainty of knowledge has been 
discussed (e.g., Schraw et al., 2002), but even critical research has found that some items 
associated with beliefs in certainty show stable internal consistency across measurement 
occasions (Clarebout et al., 2001). Items were therefore selected that would be: (1) associated 
with certainty beliefs, in the sense that any human may have access to certain knowledge, and 
(2) relevant to question answerability. The four items above were associated with the certainty 
factor by Bråten and Strømsø (2005). Higher socres indicate higher belief in certain 
knowledge. The items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1 = Do not agree at all to 5 = 
Totally agree.  
 
4 *Only the first two items were used for analysis in Study I, although all four items were 
included in the questionnaire. Analyses were made with all four and with only two items; 
conclusions in Study I did not change with the change in items, but Cronbach’s alpha was 
better using only the first two items. All four items were used in Study III.  
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• In unexpected situations, mankind will find ways to act. 
• Even in unexpected situations, I believe mankind can cope well. 
Mankind’s knowledge 
• How much does mankind know of all there is to know? 
• How much does mankind know of all that is important to know?” 
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Appendix C 
 
Pre-study 1 
 
The main aim of Pre-study 1 was to explore answerability judgments on 50 
questions listed in appendix A. We had divided the questions into three 
categories: consensus questions, non-consensus questions and illusion 
questions and wanted to explore if participants rated these categories 
different on current answerability. Furthermore, four individual difference 
measures were included for explorative purposes in order to investigate if 
answerability judgments were related to these individual difference measures. 
We also wanted to explore possible differences in readability between the 
consensus and non-consensus questions.   
 
Method  
Participants. One hundred students and employees5 from Nova 
Research and Development (a centre for post-secondary education and 
municipal development) in the town of Oskarshamn, Sweden, participated. 
There were 32 men and 67 women6; the mean age was 36 years (range 19 to 
66). Each participant was reimbursed with a lottery ticket worth 
approximately US$ 5.50. 
Materials. Materials consisted of an answerability questionnaire, 
‘Belief in Certainty of Knowledge’ (described below), and three other 
                                                                
5 In total, 125 participants answered the questionnaire, but 25 were excluded because they 
misinterpreted the scale. Eighteen of those 25 interpreted the scale as ‘what percent of 
Sweden’s population can answer the question?’ This alternative interpretation was identified in 
pre-tests and measured by a manipulation check multi-alternative question. This interpretation 
could be a misunderstanding, but it could also serve as a (limitedly) legitimate strategy for 
judging question answerability.  
6 One person did not answer the gender question. 
 76 
 
measures of difference, which, in the interest of brevity, will not be 
described. These measures were the Maximizing Tendency Scale, the 
Memory and Reasoning Inventory, and the Rosenberg’s Self-esteem Scale. 
Answerability questionnaire.  A questionnaire with 50 questions was 
prepared (see Appendix A). The answerability judgment scale ran from 0% 
(Cannot be answered) to 100% (Can be answered) in intervals of 10% 
(Figure 1). 
 
Current answerability scale 
Cannot be                                             Can be  
answered                                           answered 
 (0%)                                                                     (100%)  
   0     10     20     30     40     50     60     70     80     90     100    
Figure 1. The answerability scale used in Pre-study 1. 
 
Certainty beliefs. We used four items from a factor tapping beliefs in 
certainty of knowledge in the epistemic beliefs measure presented by Bråten 
and Strømsø (2005). Cronbach’s alpha was .75 (items are listed in Appendix 
B). 
Individual difference measures. Three other individual measures 
(mentioned at the end of the first paragraph of this section) were also 
collected but are not reported in detail.  
Procedure. The test battery was administered in a controlled 
classroom setting in small groups of approximately 10 to 30 people. 
Participants first completed the answerability questionnaire, then three 
questionnaires tapping the three scales mentioned above, and finally, the 
‘Belief in Certainty of Knowledge’ questionnaire.  
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Results 
Mean values of the answerability judgments for the respective questions 
varied from nearly 100% to about 20% answerability. As expected, consensus 
questions were perceived to be most answerable (M = 88%), followed by 
illusion (M = 80%), and non-consensus questions (M = 48%, see Table 2. A 
repeated measures ANOVA with a three-level repeated measure (question 
type: consensus, non-consensus, and illusion) showed there was a significant 
difference in answerability level between the three question types, F(2,190) = 
187.67, p < 0.001, generalised η2 = .41. Post hoc analysis with Bonferroni 
correction showed that all three groups differed significantly from each other 
(p < 0.05).  
 
Table 2. Mean values of Current Answerability for Consensus Questions, 
Non-Consensus Questions and Illusion questions.  
            M%          SD 
Question type   
Consensus 88  17 
Non-consensus 48 18 
Illusion 80 25 
Note. Current answerability was measured on a current answerability scale 
where 100% = Can be answered today; 0% = Cannot be answered.  
 
Certainty beliefs. Certainty beliefs were only correlated with the 
answerability ratings for the non-consensus questions, r(94) = .38, p < 0.001. 
That is, greater belief in certain knowledge was associated with higher 
answerability judgments for these questions.  
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We also wanted analyse the extent to which beliefs in certainty of 
knowledge were associated with extreme judgments about answerability. 
Therefore, we computed the total number of times the scale-ends 0% and 
100% were used for the three types of questions (certainty, non-consensus, 
and illusion). Two correlations, between certainty beliefs and the frequencies 
of 0% and 100% answers were computed. Higher certainty beliefs were 
associated with less frequent use of 0% (Cannot be answered), r(95) = −.29, 
p = 0.004. However, there was no significant correlation with 100%.  
Individual difference measures. We did not find any significant 
correlation between the three other individual differences measures and 
answerability judgments.  
Readability. Since we wanted to explore if the non-consensus questions 
may be harder to read and therefore harder to grasp then the consensus 
questions, we analysed these questions on readability, that is, how easy they 
are to read. We used a standardised computation tool, the automatic 
readability index (ARI), an index that takes the number of letters, words and 
sentences into account (see Rajendar & Kumar, 2012). There were no 
significant differences in readability between the consensus and non-
consensus questions. 
 
Discussion 
We concluded that participants separated the questions that we denoted as 
consensus questions from non-consensus questions, and that this division 
could be useful for further studies. We also concluded that the illusion 
questions were considered special and could be an interesting category in 
further studies.  
Since certainty beliefs correlated with answerability judgments of non-
consensus questions, we decided to investigate this measure once again in 
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relation to the current answerability judgment scale (in Study I). The lack of 
correlations between consensus questions and individual difference variables 
may be caused by a ceiling effect inducing a restricted range in answerability 
for the category. However, it may also be due to a “true effect” of individual 
differences asserting themselves more when consensus effects are less 
prevalent. 
Since we did not find any correlations between the other measures we 
concluded not to use them in relation to this scale type on answerability.  One 
reason for the lack of significant differences between answerability and the 
individual difference measures might have been that ‘I know the answer’ was 
not separated from ‘Someone else knows the answer’. If doing so, some of 
the measures may be more interesting to use in future studies, since they may 
be related to differences in beliefs about own knowledge versus others’ 
knowledge.  
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Pre-study 2 
 
The purpose of Pre-study 2 was to investigate whether the classification of 
consensus and non-consensus questions was valid. We wanted to validate that 
other persons agreed with us that the majority of the Swedish population 
would believe the consensus questions were possible to answer, while fewer 
people in Sweden would believe the non-consensus questions were 
answerable. We also wanted to explore whether participants felt that they 
understood the questions we asked, as different abilities to understand the 
questions may lead to different judgments about answerability.  
 
Method  
Participants. 100 participants from a student pool at the University of 
Gothenburg answered a web survey.  
Materials. We used the 50 question items from Pre-study 1 (listed in 
Appendix A). Participants estimated, for each of the 50 items, the proportion 
of Swedes that would consider the question to be answerable (on a scale from 
0% to 100%). Participants also rated the 50 questions on their 
understandability on a scale ranging from 0% (totally impossible to 
understand) to 100% (totally understandable).  
Procedure. Participants first rated the 50 question items on the 
proportions of Swedes that would consider the question answerable and after 
that rated the 50 items on understandability.  
 
Result 
Estimated consensus about answerability in the Swedish population. 
On average participants judged that 78% of the Swedes would consider 
consensus questions answerable, but estimated that only 54% of the Swedish 
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population would regard non-consensus questions answerable. Participants 
further believed that 66% of the Swedes would judge the illusion questions to 
be answerable. The difference in estimated answerability between consensus, 
non-consensus, and illusion questions among Swedes was significant F(2, 47) 
= 72.31, p < 0.001 which supported the researchers’ intuitions. Bonferroni 
post hoc tests showed that all question categories differed significantly from 
each other (p < 0.01).  
Understandability. Consensus questions were rated most 
understandable (M = 90, SD =1.7), non-consensus questions second (M = 74, 
SD = 1.9) and illusion questions least (M = 72, SD = 4.4). The difference was 
significant F(2, 47) = 23.3, p < 0.001. Post hoc tests with Bonferroni 
correction (p < 0.001) showed that consensus questions had a higher rated 
understandability than both non-consensus and illusion questions. However, 
no significant difference was found between illusion and non-consensus 
questions.  
 
Discussion 
The results supported that the categorisation in consensus and non-consensus 
was valid. If almost 80% of the Swedish people believe a question is 
answerable, it could be considered that consensus exists that the question is 
answerable. However, if only half of the population believe the question is 
answerable, this may be interpreted that there is not a clear consensus that the 
question is answerable in the Swedish population.  
Regarding understandability the consensus questions were rated as 
more answerable than the non-consensus and the illusion question. Since 
consensus questions were rated as more answerable in Pre-study 1, 
understandability can be related to answerability in the sense that questions 
that are perceived to be better understood are also perceived more 
answerable. The illusion questions may be special in relation to 
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understandability since we may expect a larger spread both in 
understandability and answerability on these items. A person that is 
somewhat familiar with the terms in the illusion question or a person that is 
very familiar with the terms and processes the illusion question on a shallow 
level, may believe that somebody else can understand and answer the 
question (or the person self if given more effort and time). However, for a 
person with deeper knowledge that processes the question thoroughly, an 
illusion question may seem totally understandable and also not possible to 
answer, for example since it may be perceived as a trick question.  
 
   
